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Preconstitutional Federal Power 
Matthew L.M. Fletcher* 
In two fields of constitutional law, the United States Supreme CoUIt has acknowledged 
that the federal govemment may possess preconstitutional power, or national authon"ty derived, 
not fivm the United States Constitution, but fivm the vel)' fact of sovereignty This Article 
analyzes the two areas of law-the Foreign Affairs Power and the Indian Affairs Power-and 
assesses their viabiiJ"ty in fUture cases. The case recognizing a preconstitutional Foreign Affairs 
Power resting with the executive branch, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., suffers 
fivm poor historical reasoning and has little precedential weight in modem fbreJgn affairs cases, 
but has never been overruled. The Indian Affairs Power case, United States v. Lara, decJded in 
2004, included no historical reasoning and only offered the theol)' as dicta. However, the CoUIt 
raised the theory, perhaps, as a means of placating the textualists on the CoUIt who do not VIeW 
the Indian Commerce Clause as a viable source of congressional power in Indian Affairs. This 
Article offers a deknse fbr the proposition that congressional plenmy power in Indian Affairs 
might den've fivm a preconstitutional source, a deknse that includes the onginal understanding 
of the Indian Affairs Power, and that unlike the Foreign Affairs Power, did survive the ratification 
of the Constitution. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In two areas of federal law, the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that the federal government may have preconstitutional 
authority-authority not derived from the enumerated powers of the 
Constitution, but inherent authority derived from the very fact of 
national sovereignty.' First, in Umted States v. Curtiss- Wdght Export 
Corp., the Court recognized that presidential authority to act in a 
foreign affairs context may be a "necessary concomitant[] of 
nationality" originating in a national source of authority that existed 
prior to the ratification of the Articles of Confederation and the 
Constitution.2 This Article will refer to this authority as the "Foreign 
Affairs Power." More recently, in United States v. Lara, the Supreme 
Court proposed a theory (although it did not rely exclusively upon the 
theory for its holding) that the federal government may have 
preconstitutional authority to deal in Indian affairs beyond the 
strictures of the Indian Commerce Clause or the structure of the 
Constitution.3 This Article will refer to this authority as the "Indian 
I. Of course, there are serious difficulties using the tenn inherent authonty in this 
context. See Louis Fisher, Invoking Inherent Powers: A Pnmer, 37 PRES. STUD. Q. I, 2 
(2007). 
2. 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). Cumss- Wright identified other examples as well, all 
from the foreign affairs field such as "[t]he power to acquire territory by discovery and 
occupation, the power to expel undesirable aliens, [and] the power to make such international 
agreements as do not constitute treaties in the constitutional sense." Id (citations omitted). 
3. 541 U.S. 193,201 (2004). The existence of the possibility of the theory had been 
recognized before. See Oneida Indian Nation ofN.Y. v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1150-55 
(2d Cir. 1988); Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REv. 31, 65-
66 (1996); cf. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886) (stating that the power 
must vest in the federal government because "it has never existed anywhere else"). Even 
Justice Sutherland, as a Senator in 1910, asserted that the Indian Affairs Power derived from a 
preconstitutional source of authority. See George Sutherland, The Intemal and Extemal 
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Affairs Power.'>4 In Lara, the Court stressed that preconstitutional 
federal authority may be analogous to the Foreign Affairs Power, as 
described in Curtiss- Wnght, in that it derives from a national power 
that predates the Constitution.s 
The recognition of extraconstitutional authority is an extra-
ordinary circumstance, available perhaps only in extraordinary 
situations.6 There have been occasions when an exercise of federal 
authority that goes beyond the text of the Constitution is nevertheless 
constitutional.7 President Lincoln's actions in the early period of the 
Civil War "suspended the writ of habeas corpus, withdrew funds from 
the Treasury, called forth the state militia, and placed a blockade on the 
rebellious states without legislative authority," but Congress, of course, 
ratified these actions.s What sets Curtiss- Wnght and Lara apart from 
other cases of extraconstitutional authority is the preconstitutional 
character of the authority.9 In these two cases, the authority exercised 
by the national government exists, in theory, despite the fact that the 
Constitution is not a plenary powers constitution but is instead an 
enumerated powers constitution. 10 What this Article will show is that 
the United States, acting through the Continental Congress during the 
Revolutionary War and prior to the Articles of Confederation, 
exercised a "national authority" independent and separate from the 
Powers ofthe National Government, 191 N. AM. REv. 373,385 (1910) (quoting Kagama, 118 
u.s. at 380). 
4. In discussing an "Indian Affairs Power," this Article will not attempt to define the 
extent and scope of the power, other than assuming that the power is plenary, or, something 
less than total, absolute authority over the affairs with and ofIndians and Indian tribes, but 
enough to accomplish many of the statutes enacted by Congress in accordance with this 
Power. See generally Sam Deloria, New Paradigm: lndian Tnbes in the Land of Unintended 
Consequences, 46 NAT. RESOURCES 1. 30 I, 307 (2006) ("On balance, and especially in the last 
80 years, the Plenary Indian Power of Congress has created a zone within which tribal 
governmental status can be recognized by the federal government, and within which tribes 
enjoy protection from state power. The concept of federal recognition of an Indian tribe is a 
key element of the continued effective political existence of tribal governments, and the scope 
of that recognition-that is, the measure of the powers of tribes that will be given effect in the 
American system-is the key to the tribal future."). 
5. Lara, 541 U.S. at 201-02. 
6. See Curtiss- Wdgh~ 299 U.S. at 318. 
7. Fisher, supra note I, at 2-3 (citing Lincoln's actions in the early period of the Civil 
War). 
8. Id 
9. See Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tdbal FungIbility, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1069, 
1104-05 (2004). 
10. But cf. Randy E. Barnett, W7Ios AlTaid of Unenumerated Rights?, 9 U. PA. 1. 
CaNST. L. I, I (2006) (highlighting the Ninth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Privileges or Immunities Clause as two instances where the Constitution recognizes 
unenumerated powers). 
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state sovereigns. I I It is this national authority that predates the 
Constitution and can be characterized as "preconstitutional." Once the 
states ratified the Articles of Confederation (and perhaps earlier), and 
later the Constitution, some, but not all, of these national powers 
receded and became subsumed into the governing, organic 
documents. 12 The authority exercised by the United States through its 
disparate branches (legislative, executive, and judicial) can be 
characterized as "confederal" or "federal" authority, depending upon 
the period. For purposes of this Article, I intend to maintain a 
distinction between "national," "confederal," and "federal" authority. 
Part II of this Article describes the two areas of constitutional 
authority at issue-the Foreign Affairs Power and the Indian Affairs 
Power. The Foreign Affairs Power described by Justice Sutherland's 
majority opinion in Curtiss- Wright is a robust, plenary presidential 
power that originated during the very early days of the Revolutionary 
War. 13 This authority existed, it appears, as a national sovereign power 
that predated the Articles and the Constitution and, according to the 
Court, implicitly survived the ratification of both documents. 14 Part II 
also introduces the Indian Affairs Power described in dicta by Justice 
Breyer's majority opinion in Lara. 15 According to the theory of the 
Lara dictum, the Indian Affairs Power exercised by Congress (and 
perhaps the President) might also predate the Articles and the 
Constitution. 16 Justice Breyer cited to the Curtiss- Wright opinion as 
authority for this theory. 17 
Part III examines the viability of the Curtiss- Wright holding that 
the Foreign Affairs Power, in relation to the original understanding of 
the pre-Articles Continental Congress, as well as the Founders of the 
Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, is an unenumerated 
power. Part III concludes that this theory has historical support in 
terms of the understanding of the Continental Congress during the 
11. Cf. Merrill Jensen, The Idea of a National Government During the American 
Revolution, 58 POL. SCI. Q. 356, 357 (1943) ("[There is a] clear distinction made by 
eighteenth century political leaders between the tenns 'federal' and 'national' as applied to 
central governments."). 
12. See Prakash, supra note 9, at 1086-1102 (describing the various textual sources in 
the Constitution granting the federal government powers over Indian affairs). 
13. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-22 (1936). 
14. Id at 315-18. 
15. 541 U.S. 193,201-02 (2004). 
16. See id (explaining that because Indian affairs have been seen as an aspect of 
military or foreign policy, the federal government's power in that area would be derived from 
its status as a sovereign entity). 
17. Id at 201. 
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Revolutionary War until the ratification of the Articles, but then doubts 
(without concluding) that much, if any, of the national authority that 
existed prior to the Articles survived the ratification of either the 
Articles or the Constitution. Nevertheless, Part III proposes a theory 
that the origins of the national Foreign Affairs Power rested in the 
necessity of the Continental Congress and the states. Assuming that a 
necessity arises once again in a manner not contemplated by the 
Constitution, in theory, the national Foreign Affairs Power might once 
again come into play. 
Part N attempts to examine the national Indian Affairs Power 
theorized in the Lara dictum. The Indian Affairs Power, like the 
Foreign Affairs Power, originated during the Revolutionary War in a 
time of great necessity. The history and original understanding of the 
Indian Affairs Power deviates substantially from that of the Foreign 
Affairs Power after the ratification of the Articles and later, the 
Constitution. While a plausible argument could be made that a 
national necessity that existed from the time of the Revolution through 
the modem era authorized the exercise of the Indian Affairs Power to 
this day, a better argument couched in the history and original 
(mis)understanding of the Indian Affairs Power exists. In this theory, 
the original understanding of the Founders was that the Indian tribes 
located within the exterior boundaries of the United States would 
eventually assimilate and disappear, an understanding that never came 
to pass (for at least 560 tribes).ls Because of this original 
(mis)understanding, the Constitution is not adequate to deal with 
Indian affairs, creating the necessity that justifies delving into the 
pre constitutional national authority-the Indian Affairs Power-as a 
means of authorizing federal plenary power in Indian affairs. 
II. A TALE OF Two AREAS OF PRECONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Twice now, the Supreme Court has announced theories of 
constitutional law that would appear to shake the foundations of 
constitutional law's precept that the Constitution is exclusively an 
enumerated powers constitution.19 One case, United States v. Curtiss-
18. See Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and 
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV, 195, 200 (1984); see also David Wilkins, Seasons of Change: 
Of Reronns, Melees, and Revolutions in Indian Country, in AMERICAN INDIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS 35, 46 (Eric D. Lamont 
ed., 2006) (noting that there are "more than 560 federally recognized tribes"). 
19. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 20\-02 (reintroducing the theory that the Indian Affairs 
Power is plenary); see also Curtiss- Wnght, 299 U.S. at 318 (stating that the presidential 
Foreign Affairs Power is plenary). In the context of state sovereignty, of course, the Supreme 
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Wn"ght, drew significant attention at the time it was decided20 and 
continues to draw hostility and venom from academics.21 Justice 
Sutherland's theory that the President's foreign affairs powers are 
plenary, as opposed to the federal government's internal affairs powers 
that he acknowledged are enumerated and limited, came at a time 
when world affairs were unstable and dangerous.22 The opinion also 
came down at a time when the legitimacy of the Supreme Court was in 
its own danger zone, with wounds from the conflicts between the 
Court and the President over the extent of federal and state authority 
still bleeding.23 
In comparison, the Court's recent decision in Lara, which 
reintroduced the theory that federal Indian affairs authority could be 
characterized as preconstitutional,24 drew almost no attention from 
mainstream constitutional law scholars.25 Of course, for American 
Court recognized a preconstitutional sovereign immunity that survived the ratification of the 
Constitution. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). 
20. 299 U.S. 304 (1936); see Julius Goebel, Jr., Constitutional History and 
Constitutional Law, 38 COLUM. L. REv. 555, 571-73 (1938); David M. Levitan, The Foreign 
Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherlands Theory, 55 YALE LJ. 467 (1946); 
C. Perry Patterson, In re the United States v. The Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 22 TEX. L. REv. 
286 (1944). 
21. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER 
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 94-95 (1990) (pointing out that CUItiss- Wright has been the 
subject of "withering" criticism); Raoul Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign 
Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26 (1972) (noting that some parts of Cur1iss- Wnght are "ill 
considered"); Louis Fisher, The Law: Presidential Inherent Power: The "Sole Organ" 
Doctrine, 37 PRES. STUD. Q. 139, 139-40 (2007) (noting that support for the proposition cited 
in Curtiss- Wright purportedly granting the President broad powers is misleading); Walter 
LaFeber, The Constitution and Umied States Foreign Policy: An Interpretation, 741. AM. 
HIST. 695, 710-11 (1987) (describing Justice Sutherland's analysis as "highly questionable"); 
Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical 
Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. I, 14 (1973) (highlighting a "flaw" in the opinion). 
22. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES § 4.6.1, at 367 (3d ed. 2006) (noting that the case came down at a time when U.S. 
arms manufacturers were purportedly involved in other nations' wars); G. EDWARD WHITE, 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 62 (2000) (describing the emergence of totalitarian 
states and political dislocations after World War l). 
23. See ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 148-49 (1987) 
(discussing the Court's challenge of New Deal measures and legislation that was met with 
criticism). 
24. 541 U.S. 193,201-02 (2004). 
25. But see Prakash, supra note 9, at 1103 (asserting that the Lara dictum will not 
"win over those who steadfastly believe that the federal government is a government of 
enumerated powers"). Although one journalist did report on Lara, see Linda Greenhouse, 
Court Upholds Tribal Power It Once Denied, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2004, at A12, Lara was not 
a salient case, defmed by some to be a case that appears on the front page of the Times. See 
LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 156 
(2006). 
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Indian law observers, Lara could be the most important Indian law 
decision in decades,26 but even in that context, the notion that federal 
Indian affairs authority could be described as preconstitutional has not 
generated much discussion.27 
This Part reintroduces the Curtiss- Wnghttheory that presidential 
authority in foreign affairs could be construed as plenary,28 with careful 
attention given to the leading criticisms of Justice Sutherland's 
"essay.,,29 The first Subpart explains that given the intense criticisms 
and hostility toward the opinion, it is not much of a surprise that during 
the early years of the Roberts Court and in the dregs of the War on 
Terror, Justice Sutherland's opinion carries little or no weight in the 
Court. The second Subpart explains Justice Breyer's dictum in Lara 
that relied upon, among other authorities, Curtiss- Wnght (of all 
authorities) for a description of the source of federal authority in 
Indian affairs. This Subpart will also explain the emerging rift on the 
Court (a rift that has been played out over decades in the American 
Indian law literature) over the source and extent of federal authority in 
Indian affairs. 
A. The Foreign Affairs Power 
The Foreign Affairs Power is shared by the President and 
Congress.30 The President may negotiate and sign treaties, as well as 
26. The discussion of Lara in Indian law scholarship is extensive. Eg., Bethany R. 
Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA L. REv. 5, 19-24 (2004); 
Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Fedeml Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
431, 463-72 (2005); Robert Laurence, Don't Think of a Hippopotamus: An Essay on First-
~ar Contracts, Earthquake Prediction, Gun Control in Baghdad, the Indian Civil Rights Ac~ 
the Clean ~ter Ac~ and Justice Thomas's Separate Opinion in United States v. Lara, 40 
TULSA L. REV. 137, 146-53 (2004); Frank Pommersheim, Lara: A Constitutional Crisis in 
Indian Law?, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 299, 299-305 (2004); Alex Tallchief Skibine, United 
States v. Lara, Indian Tribes, and the Dialectic ofIncorpomtion, 40 TULSA L. REv. 47, 51-56 
(2004); Kevin K. Washburn, Lara, Lawrence, Supreme Court Litigation, and Lessons !Tom 
Social Movements, 40 TULSA L. REV. 25, 26-32 (2004). 
27. But see COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.01[4], at 397-98 & 
nn.53-54 (Lexis Nexis 2005) (1941). 
28. On occasion, the CurtJss-Wnghtholding is referred to as dicta. Eg., Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579,635-36 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, 1., 
concurring); Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President's Completion Power, 115 
YALE L.1. 2280, 2288 (2006). 
29. See intra Part II.A.2. 
30. See genemlly LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 83-130 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that each branch's role in foreign affairs is 
unclear); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign 
Affairs, III YALE L.1. 231, 243 (200 I). 
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appoint ambassadors, with the advice and consent of the Senate.31 
Congress is authorized to regulate commerce with foreign nations and 
to define and punish piracy and offenses against the law of nations.32 
The War Powers portion of the Foreign Affairs Power is also shared.33 
Congress has the power to declare war and the President acts as the 
Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States.34 
Congress is authorized to maintain armies and navies, to regulate these 
armed forces, and to provide for the common defense of the Union.35 
Congress also may suspend the writ of habeas corpus in cases of 
rebellion or invasion and has the power to declare the punishment of 
treason.36 Since the Revolutionary War, the Foreign Affairs Power has 
been all national and federal, to the exclusion of the states.37 
While much of the authority exercised by the President and 
Congress in their foreign affairs capacities is not controversial,38 one 
aspect of the Foreign Affairs Power remains controversial-the 
existence of extraconstitutional (or preconstitutional) authority.39 One 
specific example is the ongoing dispute over whether the President has 
inherent authority as the head of the Executive branch to take action 
not authorized (or, in other instances, even prohibited) by Congress.40 
This Article will discuss a small but significant aspect of this debate-
whether there is a foreign affairs power that the President may exercise 
outside the scope of Article II or a congressional delegation. 
31. us. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
32. /d art. I, § 8, cis. 3, 10. 
33. See id art. I, § 8, cl. II; id art. II, § 2, cl. l. 
34. /d art. I, § 8, cl. II; id art. II, § 2, cI. l. 
35. /d art. I, § 8, cis. I, 12-14. 
36. /d art. I, § 9, cl. 2; id art. III, § 3, cl. 2. 
37. HENKIN, supra note 30, at 13, 149-67. Henkin went on to acknowledge that states 
have influence over foreign affairs through representatives elected to Congress. See ld at 
167-69. 
38. But cf. GoRDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REpUBLIC: 1776-
1787, at 521 (1969) ("The supreme magistrate was truly awesome. Standing alone, as 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces unencumbered by an executive council, with power 
over appointments that few state executives possessed and with a term of office longer than 
any, the president was a magistrate who could 'easily become king."'). 
39. See, e.g., Levitan, supra note 20, at 472-80 (tracing the development of Justice 
Sutherland's interpretation of the Foreign Affairs Power as expressed in CUJ1iss- Wnght and 
noting its controversial nature). 
40. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 US. 507 (2004); Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US. 579 (1952); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 US. 
304,315 (1936). 
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1. United States v. Curtiss- Wnght Export Corp. 
In 1934, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the 
President to prohibit the exportation of arms to Bolivia, then engaged 
in a military conflict with Paraguay in the region of Chaco, at his 
discretion.41 Congress criminalized violations of the resolution in the 
event the President invoked the authority to prohibit the arms 
transfers.42 That day, the President issued a proclamation invoking the 
authority to ban the sale of arms to Bolivia and Paraguay in 
accordance with the Joint Resolution.43 The federal government 
indicted Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation for violation of the Joint 
Resolution and Presidential Proclamation on May 29, 1934.44 The 
alleged arms exporters claimed that the Joint Resolution effectuated 
"an invalid declaration of legislative power to the executive.'>45 While it 
appears that Justice Sutherland's majority opinion could have focused 
on alternate reasoning in reaching the conclusion that Congress's 
delegation of authority contained in the Joint Resolution was valid, 46 it 
instead chose to elucidate an unprecedented articulation of the 
executive foreign affairs power.47 
Justice Sutherland asserted that "[t]he broad statement that the 
federal government can exercise no powers except those specifically 
enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied' powers as are 
necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is 
categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs.'>48 Justice 
Sutherland then explained this audacious statement with a recitation of 
41. Joint Resolution To Prohibit the Sale of Anns or Munitions of War in the United 
States Under Certain Conditions § 1,48 Stat. 811 (1934). 
42. Id § 2. 
43. Proclamation, Sale of Anns and Munitions of War to Bolivia and Paraguay, 48 
Stat. 1744 (1934). 
44. Curtiss- Wnght, 299 US. at 311. 
45. Idat314. 
46. See generally id at 322-29 (discussing a host of prior similar congressional 
delegations of authority); see also id at 322 ("[I]t is evident that this court should not be in 
haste to apply a general rule which will have the effect of condemning legislation like that 
under review as constituting an unlawful delegation of legislative power. The principles 
which justify such legislation fmd overwhelming support in the unbroken legislative practice 
which has prevailed almost from the inception of the national government to the present 
day."); Lofgren, supra note 21, at 8 ("To establish and sanction such a category Sutherland 
might have followed the lead of the government on brief and cited long-standing legislative 
and judicial precedent, but he rejected this simple course." (citing Brief for the United States 
at 7-9, IS, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 US. 304 (1936) (No. 98»). 
47. See Curtiss- Wright, 299 US. at 311-22. But, as Charles Lofgren pointed out, 
Justice Sutherland had articulated this view in 1910 from his position in the Senate. See also 
Sutherland, supra note 3, at 373-82. 
48. Curtiss-Wnght, 299 US. at 315-16. 
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debatable constitutional history: "[T]he primary purpose of the 
Constitution was to carve from the general mass of legislative powers 
then possessed by the states such portions as it was thought desirable 
to vest in the federal government, leaving those not included in the 
enumeration still in the states.'>49 Justice Sutherland then asserted that 
the states had "never possessed international powers.',50 According to 
this theory, the sovereign entity that would become the United States 
during the time of the Revolution, engaged in a war with Britain and 
otherwise exercising the Foreign Affairs Power, was the Continental 
Congress.51 Justice Sutherland theorized that when "the external 
sovereignty of Great Britain in respect of the colonies ceased, it 
immediately passed to the Union.,,52 Justice Sutherland concluded: 
It results that the investment of the federal government with the 
powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative 
grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to 
conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with 
other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the 
Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary 
concomitants of nationality. . .. As a member of the family of nations, 
the right and power of the United States in that field are equal to the 
right and power of the other members of the international family. 
Otherwise, the United States is not completely sovereign.53 
But, of course, the Constitution provides extensive foreign affairs and 
war powers to the United States,54 which would seem to reduce the 
expansive Curtiss-Wright language to a state of mere dicta.55 
Moreover, Justice Jackson's opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. SaJry'erwould have limited the Curtiss- Wnghttheory to a statement 
49. Jd at 316 (citing Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294 (1936)). 
50. Jd 
51. Jd ("Even before the Declaration, the colonies were a unit in foreign affairs, 
acting through a common agency-namely the Continental Congress, composed of delegates 
from the thirteen colonies. That agency exercised the powers of war and peace, raised an 
army, created a navy, and fmally adopted the Declaration ofIndependence."). 
52. Jd at 317 (citing Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 80-81 (1795)); see also 
Samuel H. Beer, Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
9,12 (1978) (arguing that the "national theory ... is a superior [theory]"). 
53. Curtiss- Wright, 299 U.S. at 318. Justice Sutherland also noted that "[i]n Bumet 
v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 396 (1933), we said, 'As a nation with all the attributes of 
sovereignty, the United States is vested with all the powers of government necessary to 
maintain an effective control of international relations.'" Id 
54. Seegeneral(yHENKlN, supra note 30, at 13-22 (describing the source and scope 
of the federal government's Foreign Affairs Power under the Constitution). 
55. But see id at 20 (referring to Curtiss- Wnght as "authoritative doctrine"); 
Lofgren, supra note 21, at I n.l, 32 (arguing that perhaps Justice Sutherland's theory is not to 
be dismissed as dicta). 
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that "the strict limitation upon congressional delegations of power to 
the President over internal affairs does not apply with respect to 
delegations of power in external affairs.,,56 
2. Representative Criticisms 
Charles Lofgren's attack on Justice Sutherland's reasoning and, in 
particular, the historical basis for his theory remains the clearest 
statement on the subjece7 Professor Lofgren reaches the conclusion, 
as have others, that Justice Sutherland's history was "'shockingly 
inaccurate'" and that "Curtiss- Wn'ght ought to be relegated to 
history.,,58 Lofgren showed how Justice Sutherland's history suffered 
from obvious mistakes. 59 For example, Lofgren pointed out that while 
Justice Sutherland had relied upon the 1783 Treaty between Great 
Britain and the United States as "a 'practical application of [the] fact' 
that external sovereignty passed immediately from Britain to the 
American Union,'>60 the Articles of Confederation already had, in 1781, 
"expressly granted to Congress the treaty-making power.'>61 Lofgren 
also proved that several pieces of evidence that Justice Sutherland used 
to support his theory were quoted out of context.62 Take, for example, 
a speech given by Rufus King during the Constitutional Convention, 
quoted by Justice Sutherland for the proposition that, in the arena of 
foreign affairs, the states had no sovereign authority.63 Professor 
Lofgren pointed out that "in the same speech, however, King clearly 
implied the [foreign affairs] power was delegated by the states.'*' In 
another example, Lofgren noted that Justice Sutherland's citation to 
Justice Patterson's opinion in Penhallow v. Doanf15 "was but one of 
four seriatim opinions in the case, and it does not support Sutherland's 
56. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, 
1., concurring). 
57. See Lofgren, supra note 21, at 6-12. 
58. Jd at 32 (quoting Paul L. Murphy, Time To Reclaim: The Current Challenge of 
American Constitutional History, 69 AM. HIST. REv. 64, 76 (1963)). 
59. Jd at 12-28. 
60. Jd at 17 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 
(1936)). 
61. Jd (citing ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (U.S. 1781)). 
62. Jd at 12-28. 
63. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 317 (quoting JAMES MADISON, DEBATES ON THE 
ADoPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 212 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 1.8. Lippincott Co. 
1901) (1845)). 
64. Lofgren, supra note 21, at 19. 
65. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 80-81 (1795). 
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argument.,,66 As a historical matter, Justice Sutherland's opinion 
remains in shambles.67 
3. The Burial of the Theory 
Regardless of the academic conclusions made about Justice 
Sutherland's theory of preconstitutional inherent foreign affairs 
authority, Clirtiss- Wright remains "authoritative doctrine."68 But, 
perhaps ironically, Curtiss- Wright does not enjoy canonical statuS.69 
The Court rarely cites to the foundational principles that Justice 
Sutherland attempted to bring to its foreign affairs jurisprudence. As 
Louis Henkin wrote, "In no case has the Supreme Court deemed it 
necessary to revisit Sutherland's theory; the theory has been 
recognized in appellate courts, perhaps grudgingly. The principle uses 
of Clirtiss- Wright are for some of its famous dicta [in relation to the 
President's exclusive authority to speak for the United States] or its 
rhetorical flourishes."70 
Perhaps most damning for Clirtiss- Wright is Justice Thomas's 
dissenting opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld71 There, Justice Thomas 
proposed the theory of the "unitary Executive" to the Court and 
garnered only one vote for his proposition-his own.72 One would 
imagine that Justice Thomas would find a friend in Justice 
Sutherland's opinion, but Justice Thomas singled out only a small 
portion of Curtiss- Wright for mention-citing the case for the 
proposition that the President, in exercising his foreign affairs authority 
"[should] be free from interference [from Congress and the COurt].,,73 
No Justice from the Roberts Court appears willing to acknowledge and 
analyze a theory of federal authority not derived from the enumerated 
powers of the Constitution.74 Perhaps this demonstrates the burial of 
the Curtiss- Wnghttheory-a burial without an explicit reversal. 
66. Lofgren, supra note 21, at 20. 
67. Id at 12-32. 
68. HENKIN, supra note 30, at 20. 
69. See id at 332 n.16. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
73. 
(1936». 
Id (citations omitted). 
542 U.S. 507,579-99 (2004) (Thomas, 1., dissenting). 
See id at 580. 
Id at 582 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 
74. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799 (2006) (Kennedy, 1., 
concurring) (providing a summary of the rationale of the case without reference to 
unenumerated powers) 
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B. The Indian Affairs Power 
Congress asserts-and the Supreme Court recognizes-a plenary 
power in Indian affairs.75 The Executive branch enjoys this plenary 
power as well, because Congress long ago delegated vast amounts of 
its authority to the President and to the Department of the Interior.76 
This power has been used for great good and for great harm to Indian 
people and to Indian tribes.77 Its plenary character could once have 
been described as all but "absolute," with the Supreme Court refusing 
for about a century to hear any challenges to Indian affairs legislation 
or exercises of regulatory discretion under the political question 
doctrine.78 However, that characterization is likely no longer accurate, 
with the Court, on rare occasions, striking down Indian affairs 
regulation in the modem era.79 
The Indian Affairs Power is far more difficult to locate in the 
Constitution than the War Power. Three main theories have served to 
provide sources for this plenary Indian Affairs Power.80 First, the only 
grant of authority with respect to Indian affairs in Article I is the Indian 
Commerce Clause, granting Congress the sole and exclusive authority 
75. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 27, § 5.02[1], at 
398 (citing United States v. Lara, 541 US. 193, 200 (2004); Washington v. Confederated 
Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 US. 463, 470 (1979»; see also United 
States v. Kagama, 118 US. 375, 380 (1886) (describing Congress's power to enact laws 
affecting Indians as deriving from its "exclusive sovereignty"). 
76. See 25 US.C. §§ 2, 9 (2000). 
77. Compare Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 US.C. §§ 1901-1903 (respecting the 
unique relationship between the United States and Indian Tribes and seeking to preserve 
tribal identity), andCOHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 27, § 11.0 I [1]-
[2], at 820-25 (describing the purpose of the Indian Child Welfare Act), with General 
Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (providing a method of US. government control ofIndian 
land and citizenship), and COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 27, 
§ 1.04, at 75-84 (describing the devastation of the allotment era in Indian country). 
78. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 US. 272, 281 (1955); United 
States v. A1cea Band ofTillamooks, 329 US. 40, 46 (1946); Nw. Bands of Shoshone Indians 
v. United States, 324 US. 335,339 (1945); Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187 US. 553, 567-68 
(1903); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 US. 294, 306-08 (1902); United States v. 
Kagama, 118 US. 375, 383-84 (1886); Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 US. 517, 525-26 (1877); 
United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 US. 188, 197 (1876); The Cherokee 
Tobacco, 78 US. (II Wall.) 616, 621 (1870); Marsh v. Brooks, 49 US. (8 How.) 223, 228-29 
(1850); United States v. Rogers, 45 US. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1845); Mitchel v. United States, 
34 US. (9 Pet.) 711, 740 (1835). 
79. Eg., Hodel v.lrving, 481 US. 704, 718 (1987). 
80. See US. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the authority to regulate 
commerce with the Indian tribes); Missouri v. Holland, 252 US. 416 (1920) (granting 
authority for various treaties with Indians); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 
US. 304 (1936) (analogizing the preconstitutional foreign affairs power to the national 
government's authority over Indian tribes). 
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to regulate commerce with the "Indian tribes.,,81 The Supreme Court 
has long accepted the Indian Commerce Clause as the source of 
congressional plenary power, despite some reservations.82 The text of 
the Indian Commerce Clause suggests (perhaps) that congressional 
authority in the field of Indian affairs is less than plenary, if one 
accepts the argument that "commerce" does not include the entire field 
(although whatever authority remained would be exclusive as to the 
states).83 The Supreme Court has identified the Treaty Clause, the War 
Power, and the Property Clause, for example, as other sources of the 
Indian Affairs Power.84 The Supreme Court has assumed that 
collectively these clauses serve as the source of the Indian Affairs 
Power.85 Second, the federal govemment has acquired authority in 
Indian affairs, a la Missouri v. HoJJand,86 in various treaties with Indian 
tribes.87 For example, the Cherokee Nation agreed to the divestiture of 
its external sovereignty in exchange for the right to remain in the 
southeastern United States free from the interference of the states and 
their citizens88 (a right, it turned out, with no remedy89). Again in 
incremental bits and pieces, the United States acquired vast (although 
perhaps not plenary) authority in Indian affairs through these treaties.90 
The Marshall Court famously fudged the history of these early treaties 
81. us. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
82. Compare Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 US. 163, 192 (1989) 
("[T]he central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary 
power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs."), and Washington v. Confederated Bands & 
Tribes of the Yakima Nation, 439 US. 463, 470 (1979) (referencing Congress's plenary and 
exclusive power over Indian affairs), with United States v. Lara, 541 US. 193, 215 (2004) 
(Thomas, 1., concurring) (noting that despite broad authority to regulate "every aspect of the 
tribes" it is nonetheless true that there are differences with respect to the scope of that power), 
and United States v. Kagama, 118 US. 375,378-79 (1886) (hesitating to accept the Indian 
Commerce Clause as an expansive grant of regulatory power over Indian affairs). 
83. See u.s. CONST. art. II, § 8, c\. 3; see also Lara, 541 US. at 200-01 (fmding that 
other aspects of federal authority are derived from other sources). 
84. See Lara, 541 US. at 200-01. 
85. See Adrian Vermeule, Three Commerce Clauses? No Problem, 55 ARK. L. REv. 
1175, 1176-78 (2003). 
86. 252 US. 416 (1920) (recognizing Congress's power to make laws in order to 
enforce and execute treaties). 
87. See, e.g., Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokee Nation, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18; 
Treaty of Fort Pitt with the Delaware Nation, Sept. 17, 1778,7 Stat. 13. 
88. SeeTreaty of Hopewell with the Cherokee Nation, supra note 87, at 19. 
89. See generally TiM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL: THE 
SOUTHERN JUDICIARY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS 234-45 (2002) 
(examining the significant costs inflicted on the Cherokee tribes as a result of the 
government's forced removal policy); RENNARD STRICKLAND, THE INDIANS IN OKLAHOMA 4 
{I 980) (describing the human costs of the removal policies). 
90. See, e.g., Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokee Nation, supra note 87, at 19. 
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to mean that when one or more tribes agreed to the divestiture of their 
external sovereignty, all tribes consented to the divestiture of their 
extemal sovereignty, an action I have referred to as a "least favored 
nations" doctrine.91 Given these complimentary theories, the Court has 
long recognized that the federal government has plenary authority over 
Indian affairs-and plenary authority over Indians and Indian tribes as 
well.92 The third theory can be described as the importation of 
preconstitutional federal authority as described in Curtiss- Wnght 93 
The Court had once implied that such a power could exist in United 
States v. Kagama,94 and then over a century later in Lara, Justice 
Breyer's majority opinion asserted it explicitly, albeit in dicta.95 In 
Kagama, the Court recognized that Congress had authority to enact 
criminal laws in Indian Country (the Major Crimes Ad6) under an 
amalgamation of implied authorities that appeared to be a combination 
of the Missoun' v. HolJand-style acquisition of authority from Indian 
treaties and Indian "dependence.,,97 The Court suggested that this 
power somehow had to exist in the federal government as a matter of 
constitutional pragmatism (necessity?) and held that it did.98 One 
important portion of the Court's opinion in Kagama was a rejection 
that the Indian Commerce Clause, or any other constitutional 
provision, authorized Congress to enact the Major Crimes Ace9 
Justice Breyer's Lara dictum may be a response to this question, 
reopened to some extent by Justice Thomas's skeptical Lara 
concurrence. 100 
What was a certainty, however-at least at the time of the 
ratification of the Constitution-was that federal authority in Indian 
affairs (whatever its scope) was exclusive of state authority. 101 History 
91. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV. 
627,658 (2006). 
92. United States v. Lara, 541 US. 193,200-01 (2004) (identifying both enumerated 
powers and treaties as sources of federal control over Indians and their affairs). 
93. 299 US. 304, 318 (1936). 
94. 118 US. 375,380 (1886). 
95. 541 US. at 200-02. 
96. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18 US.c. 
§ 1153 (2000)). 
97. SeeKagama, 118US.at384-85. 
98. SeeJd 
99. Seeid at 378-79. 
100. Lam, 541 US. at 214-26. 
101. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 US. 44, 62 (1996) ("If anything, the 
Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States to the 
Federal Govemment than does the Interstate Commerce Clause. This is clear enough from 
the fact that the States still exercise some authority over interstate trade but have been 
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shows with certainty that one of the greater weakness of the national 
government under the Articles of Confederation was the nonexclusive 
character of the Indian Affairs Power. 102 The Court has long interpreted 
the Indian Commerce Clause as excluding the authority of states to 
enter the field of Indian affairs, unless Congress consents. 103 And yet, 
for decades, Indian activists and scholars decried federal plenary 
power in Indian affairs because it was a source of deeply destructive 
federal Indian law and policy.l04 Beginning especially in the mid-
1980s, Indian law specialists and scholars divided over the scope and 
legitimacy of federal plenary power in Indian affairs. 105 While plenary 
power once created untold hardships for Indian people, Congress had 
lately begun using its plenary power, in most instances, to enact 
statutes for the benefit of Indian tribes and Indian people. 106 
Undermining the theoretical foundations of federal plenary power 
might serve to limit federal authority over Indian affairs, but it might 
also destroy much of what Indian people and tribes relied upon as their 
best hopes for a remedy. Statutes such as the Indian Child Welfare 
divested of virtually all authority over Indian commerce and Indian tribes."); County of 
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation ofN.Y., 470 US. 226, 234 (1985); Cayuga Indian Nation v. 
Cuomo, 565 F. Supp. 1297, 1307-08 (WD.N.Y. 1983); Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 528 F. 
Supp. 1359,1368-69 (D. Conn. 1982) (quoting Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 US. 833, 
852 (1976)); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107-08 (2005). 
102. See Oneida, 470 US. at 234 n.4; Robert 1. Miller, The Doctnne of Discovery in 
American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REv. 1,49 (2005). 
103. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 27, § 6.03[I][a]-[b], at 
520-25. 
104. Eg., RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: 
INDIAN TRIBES AND POLmCAL LmERTY 112-34 (1980) (describing various federal policies 
that were ignorant of or hostile to the Indians and the difficulties administering a department 
charged with oversight of Indian affairs); VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, 
AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 40-45 (1983) (exploring the growth of federal laws 
that have placed Indians at the mercy of Congress and the federal government). 
105. Compare Robert Laurence, Learning To Live with the Plenary Power of Congress 
over the Indian Nations, 30 ARIz. L. REv. 413, 437 (1988) (embracing the plenary power as a 
comparison to tribal sovereignty), and Robert Laurence, On Eurocentric Myopia, the 
Designated Hitter Rule, and "The Actual State of Things, "30 ARIz. L. REv. 459, 460 (1988) 
(confirming the view that Native Americans should "Iiv[e] with the plenary power of 
Congress"); with Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. 
RESEARCH 1. 1 (arguing that Congress does not have plenary power to legislate in the field of 
Indian affairs), and Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian 
Tribes, 34 ARIz. ST. L.1. 113 (2003) (same). 
106. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 27, § 1.07, at 97-
113; see also CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN 
NATIONS 249 (2005) (describing the progress made by Indians with respect to federal 
recognition of tribal rights); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian 
Policy, 85 NEB. L. REv. 121, 140-54 (2006) (providing an overview of congressional 
legislation that promotes tribal self-determination). 
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Act,107 the Indian Civil Rights Act,108 or even the various Indian self-
determination acts lO9-statutes that did not obviously implicate Indian 
commerce-appeared to be at risk if Indian law scholars were 
successful in persuading the Court to limit federal plenary power."o 
This was the paradox for Indian law advocates prior to Lara. 
1. Umted States v. Lara 
The scholarly and political debate over federal plenary power did 
not reach the halls of federal courts in any significant manner until 
Congress enacted an amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act that 
attempted to reaffirm the inherent tribal authority to prosecute 
nonmember Indians. III In Duro v. Reina, the Supreme Court, per 
Justice Kennedy, held that Indian tribes had been implicitly divested of 
authority to prosecute all nonmembers, including members of Indian 
tribes who resided on the reservations of other tribes and who 
participated socially and economically in the foreign reservation. 112 In 
1991, Congress acted quickly to reverse the decision in an enactment 
popularly known as the "Duro Fix.,,"3 Within the decade, nonmember 
Indians began bringing challenges to their tribal criminal prosecutions 
in federal court, arguing that Congress's plenary power did not extend 
to the authority to reverse the Supreme Court's common law decision 
in Duro, or to the authority needed to force nonmember Indians to face 
tribal prosecutions. I 14 By the late 1990s, federal circuit courts were 
107. 25 US.c. §§ 1901-1963 (2000). 
108. Id §§ 1301-1303. 
109. Eg., Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act, 25 US.C. 
§ 450a; Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996, 25 U.S.c. 
§§ 4\01-4243. 
110. See United States v. Lara, 541 US. 193,200-02 (2004) (describing the locus of 
federal power over Indian affairs as originating in the Indian Commerce Clause). 
III. 25 US.c. § 1301(2) (,"[P]owers of self-government' means and includes all 
governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all 
offices, bodies, and tribunals by and through which they are executed, including courts of 
Indian offenses; and means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and 
affinned, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians . ... " (emphasis added»; Nell 
Jessup Newton, Pennanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REv: 109, 
109-13 (1992); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation that Overtumed It-
A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 767, 767 (1993). 
112. 495 US. 676, 679-85 (1990). 
113. See, e.g., Will Trachman, Comment, Tnoal Criminal Jurisdiction after US. v. 
Lara: Answenng Constitutional Challenges to the Duro Fix, 93 CAL. L. REv. 847, 848 
(2005). 
114. Eg., United States v. Long, 324 F.3d 475, 476-77 (7th Cir. 2003) (appealing a 
tribal court conviction to federal court); United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 664-65 (9th Cir. 
2001) (en banc) (same); Means v. N. Cheyenne Tribal Court, 154 F.3d 941, 943-47 (9th Cir. 
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grasping with the very question that Indian academics and activists 
had been squabbling about for well over a decade-the extent of 
federal plenary power. 115 And, with the exception of Indian activists 
facing tribal prosecutions, Indian law specialists argued vehemently 
that Congress possessed at least enough authority to enact the Duro 
F· 116 IX. 
After a split between the United States Courts of Appeals for the 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the Court granted certiorari in Lara. 117 
Despite the complexity of the analysis in the lower courts over the 
extent of federal plenary power, Justice Breyer's majority opinion 
(writing for a total of five Justices) made short shrift of the argument 
that the Indian Affairs Power was anything but plenary.lls However, 
Justice Thomas's opinion concurring in the result blasted the notion of 
federal plenary power. 119 He was unable to locate any provision in the 
Constitution that granted Congress or the Executive branch much 
authority at all or otherwise protected tri.bal sovereignty.120 He noted 
that the Court had more recently revisited the Interstate Commerce 
Clause, holding that there were limitations on congressional authority 
in that field, implying that there must also be limitations on 
congressional authority under the Indian Commerce Clause. 121 He 
added that he was not persuaded by the notion that a structural reading 
of the Constitution would support the exercise of federal plenary 
power. 122 
Because Justice Thomas garnered only one vote (his own), 
Justice Breyer's majority opinion relying upon the numerous instances 
where the Court had recognized federal plenary power in Indian affairs 
controlled the outcome. 123 However, Justice Breyer's opinion, 
apparently in response to Justice Thomas's arguments, asserted that 
1998) (arguing that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction), overruled by United States v. Enas, 
255 F.3d 662 (200 I); United States v. Weaselhead, 36 F. Supp. 2d 908, 911-15 (D. Neb. 1997), 
order affU en bane, 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1999). 
115. See, e.g., Weaselhead, 36 F. Supp. 2d 908; Means, 154 F.3d 941. 
116. See, e.g., Trachman, supra note 113, at 868-76. 
117. 541 US. 193, 198-99 (2004) (outlining, in part, ways in which the Duro Fix can 
stand constitutional muster). 
118. Jd at 200. 
119. Jd at 218 (Thomas, 1., concurring). 
120. Jdat215. 
121. Jd at 224 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 US. 598, 617 (2000); United 
States v. Lopez, 514 US. 549, 553 (1995)). 
122. SeeJdat215. 
123. Jd at 196-2 IO (majority opinion). 
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there may be a different source for the Indian Affairs Power, one he 
labeled "preconstitutional.,,'24 
2. The Lara Dictum 
Justice Breyer's majority opinion stated that "the Constitution 
grants Congress broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian 
tribes, powers that we have consistently described as 'plenary and 
exclusive.",'25 Justice Breyer identified the Indian Commerce Clause 
and the Treaty Clause as the "traditional" sources of federal plenary 
power. 126 The Court noted that some authorities cited the Property 
Clause as an additional source.127 Justice Breyer added that, while it is 
silent as to Indian affairs, the Treaty Power adds to Congress's 
authority through "treaties ... [that] authorize Congress to deal with 
'matters' with which otherwise 'Congress could not deal.",'28 In his 
concurrence, Justice Thomas raised the specter of the 1871 Act of 
Congress that "purported to prohibit entering into treaties with the 
'Indian nation[s] or tribe[s]," and asserted that the Act "reflects the 
view of the political branches that the tribes had become a purely 
domestic matter."129 Justice Breyer's opinion responded that the same 
1871 Act also "saved existing treaties from being invalidated or 
impaired and this Court has explicitly stated that the statute in no way 
affected Congress' plenary powers to legislate on the problems of 
Indians." 130 
Justice Breyer then added the critical paragraph for purposes of 
this Article: 
Moreover, at least during the first century of America's national 
existence ... Indian affairs were more an aspect of military and foreign 
policy than a subject of domestic or municipal law. Insofar as that is so, 
Congress' legislative authority would rest in part, not upon affirmative 
124. Jd at 201. 
125. Jd at 200 (citing Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian 
Nation, 439 US. 463, 470-71 (1979)); Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 US. 99, 103 (1993); 
United States v. Wheeler, 435 US. 313, 323 (1978); WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERlCAN 
INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 2 (3d ed. 1998)). 
126. See Lara, 541 US. at 200 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 US. 535,552 (1974); 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 US. 164, 172 n.7 (1973)); CANBY, supra 
note 125, at 11-12). 
127. See Lara, 541 US. at 200 (citing COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 
supra note 27, § 3[a], at 209-10). 
128. Jd at 201 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920)). 
129. Jd at 218 (Thomas, 1., concurring in judgment) (quoting 16 Stat. 566 (1871) 
(codified at 25 U.S.c. § 71 (2000))). 
130. Id at 201 (majority opinion) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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grants of the Constitution, but upon the Constitution's adoption of 
preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any Federal 
Government, namely, powers that this Court has described as necessary 
concomitants of nationality. 131 
It is not entirely clear if Justice Breyer intended this paragraph to be a 
continuation of the response to Justice Thomas's argument about the 
1871 Act or whether Justice Breyer intended it to be yet another theory 
as to the source of federal plenary power. Moreover, it is not clear if 
Justice Breyer meant that the War Powers discussed in Curtiss- Wright 
are to be added to the other sources of authority that make up the 
Indian Affairs Power (that is, the Indian Commerce Clause, the Treaty 
Clause, and perhaps the Property Clause), or if Justice Breyer meant 
that the Indian Affairs Power is analogous to the War Power discussed 
in Curtiss- Wright in that they both maintain the characteristic of being 
preconstitutional, or, as is possible, a combination of both. This 
Article, for purposes of analytical clarity, will treat the citation to 
Curtiss- Wnght as the second possibility only-wherein Justice Breyer 
argues that both the Indian Affairs Power and the War Power share the 
characteristic of being preconstitutional. I32 
The Lara dictum, then, appears to be the second time in 
America's constitutional history that the Supreme Court has asserted 
that the federal government-in this case Congress-has authority that 
existed prior to the ratification of the Articles of Confederation and the 
Constitution and, it would appear, survived the ratification of both. 
Given this somewhat monumental concept, it is surprising that there 
has been so little discussion from either the mainstream constitutional 
law academy,133 or even more surprisingly, from the Indian law 
131. ld (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) 
132. If, however, Justice Breyer intended for the first inference-that the War Power 
somehow contributes to the amalgamation of textual provisions that make up the Indian 
Affairs Power-it does no harm to this Article's thesis. If Justice Breyer did intend that 
meaning, however, it is no response to a textualist like Justice Thomas, who firmly disagrees 
that such a structural reading of the Constitution is possible. See id at 215 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in judgment) ("Unlike the Court I cannot locate such congressional authority in 
the Treaty Clause or the Indian Cornmerce Clause." (citations omitted)); Prakash, supra note 
9, at 1103 (asserting that the Lara dictum will not "win over those who steadfastly believe 
that the federal government is a government of enumerated powers"). 
133. Eg., Prakash, supra note 9, at 1103 (discussing the Lara suggestion and quickly 
dismissing it as incapable of "winning over" believers in a government of enumerated 
powers). There has been much more analysis of the Lara Court's reference to Missoun· v. 
Holland and the possible expansion of congressional authority via the exercise of the Treaty 
Power. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Our Intemationai Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. I, 
15-16 (2006) (citing Lara's reference to Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920)); Duncan 
B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 
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academy. 134 This Article intends to bring light to the opaque reference 
made by Justice Breyer in the Lara dictum by offering a theory based 
on the preconstitutional history of the American republic that a 
preconstitutional Indian Affairs Power may be viable. 
Before we can assess the viability of the Lara dictum, we must 
first revisit the case upon which Justice Breyer relied, Curtiss- Wrigh~ 
and its explication of the Foreign Affairs Power.13S 
III. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATIONAL FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS POWER 
Justice Sutherland's Curtiss- Wright holding may have some basis 
in the original understanding of national authority as it existed prior to 
the ratification of the Articles of Confederation in 1781.136 Historians 
and constitutional law scholars have never reached consensus on the 
origins of national authority exercised by the Continental Congress 
from the time they began to wage general war against the British 
Empire prior to the Declaration of Independence until the ratification 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1353 (2006) (discussing how Lara shows that four Justices believe 
Missoun' v. Hol1andremains good law); Prakash, supra note 9, at 1095-96 (discussing Lara as 
an example of how the Treaty Power can expand Congress's legislative authority); Nicholas 
Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1867, 1875 (2005) (citing 
Lara as an example of the continuing reliance upon Missouri v. Hol1and by the Court); 
Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Junsprodence and a Cal1 for 
Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.1. 1885, 1895 n.66 (2005) (citing Lara as an example of how the 
scope ofthe Treaty Power can expand Congress's legislative authority). 
134. Eg., Steven 1. Gunn, Compacts, Confederacies, and Comity: Intertribal 
Enforcement ofTnbal CoUIt Orders, 34 N.M. L. REv. 297, 324 & n.179 (2004) (citing Lara 
dictum for the proposition that the Indian Affairs Power is "unmoored from the 
Constitution"); Peter Manus, Indigenous Peoples' Environmental Rights: Evolving Common 
Law Perspectives in Canada, Australia, and the United States, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. I, 
74 n.385 (2006) (quoting the Lara dictum without discussion); Alex Tallchief Skibine, 
Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes Within "Our Federa!Jsm'~' Beyond the Dependency 
Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667, 690 (2006) (discussing the Lara dictum in the context of a 
proposed constitutional amendment incorporating Indian tribes into "Our Federalism") 
(citing Frank Pommersheim, Is There a (Little or Not So Little) Constitutional Crisis 
Developing in Indian Law?: A Brief Essay, 5 U. PA. 1. CON ST. L. 271,285-87 (2003)); Clay R. 
Smith, Amencan Indian Tnbes and the Constitution, ADVOCATE (Idaho), Jan. 2005, at 19, 19 
(assuming, incorrectly, that Justice Breyer did not intend to assert the Lara dictum as a viable 
constitutional theory). See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra 
note 27, § 5.0 I [4], at 397-98 & nn.53-54 (referencing and dismissing the Lara dictum). 
135. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-22 (1936). 
136. See Jack Rakove, The Legacy of the Articles of Conkderation, 12 PUBLlUS: 1. 
FEDERALISM 45, 45 (1982) ("By the time the Articles were ratified in 1781, almost three and 
a half years after the Continental Congress had conveyed a final text to the states, many 
delegates were convinced that this long-awaited constitution was already obsolete."). 
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of the Articles. \37 For purposes of clarity in this Article only and to be 
consistent with the tenninology of the day, I will refer to this pre-
Articles, pre-Constitution authority as "national" authority or power; I 
will refer to the authority exercised during the period of the Articles of 
Confederation as "confederal" authority or power; and I will refer to 
the authority exercised under the Constitution as "federal" authority or 
power. 138 
A. The National Period' 1776 to 1781 
The theoretical underpinnings of the argument here arise in the 
period of time around the Declaration of Independence where the 
Continental Congress became the executive head of the Union to the 
ratification of the Articles of Confederation. It is perhaps the majority 
opinion of scholars that the people of the several states delegated 
aspects of their sovereignty to the national government when the states 
ratified the Articles. 139 And later when the states ratified the 
Constitution, again the people delegated sovereignty to the new 
national government. 140 But no governing document, neither the 
Articles of Confederation nor the Constitution, controlled the 
Continental Congress at this time.141 From where did sovereignty 
derive in that instance? From the people, as suggested by Justice 
Story? 142 Then how did the people of the new nation delegate their 
137. Compare WOOD, supra note 38, at 354-55 (arguing that the Continental Congress 
was created and exercised powers only because of the exigent circumstances of war), with 
Sutherland, supra note 3, at 376 (locating national sovereignty that could be exercised by the 
Continental Congress using plenary power). 
138. C£ Jensen, supra note 11, at 357 (noting that the Founders recognized a 
difference between "national" and "federal" authority). 
139. See, e.g., Rakove, supra note 136, at 50-53 (discussing the division of federal and 
state power under the Articles of Confederation). 
140. Jd at 55-60 (describing the substantive differences between the allocation of 
power and sovereignty between the Articles and the Constitution). 
141. See Claude H. Van T yne, Sovereignty in the American Revolution: An Historical 
Study, 12 AM. HIST. REv. 529, 539-43 (1907) (discussing the purposes for which the States 
carne together in the Continental Congress and noting that it could not act under a governing 
document, but rather needed permission from the States). 
142. See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 216, at 159 (1891) ("From the crown of Great Britain, the sovereignty of their 
country passed to the people of it .... " (quoting Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 
470 (1793»). This claim from the Commentaries carne under withering attack as the exact 
timing of the grasping of sovereignty by the Continental Congress. See Van Tyne, supra note 
141, at 529-42 (challenging the view that the people consciously gave sovereignty to the 
Continental Congress at its formation). However, later historians concluded that "a single 
sovereign power, the people of the United States, created both the federal and state 
governments .... The national theory ... is a superior interpretation of what actually 
happened .... " Beer, supra note 52, at 12. 
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sovereignty to the Continental Congress? Did they even care?143 
Justice Story's Commentan"es, quoting from early Supreme Court 
decisions, argued that the Continental Congress did exercise 
significant national authority regardless of the subjective views of 
American leaders.144 "The psychology of politics means ... real 
obedience is a matter of degree, and real sovereignty is a complex of 
accommodation between conflicting groupS.,,145 
It is my contention that this period of history has been glossed 
over by the Supreme Court in important respects because of the 
relative lack of importance to modem constitutional law. 146 Other than 
in Curtiss- Wn"gh~ the question of whether aspects of the Foreign 
Affairs Power of the federal government are national powers (as 
opposed to enumerated, federal or confederal powers) does not detail 
the Supreme COurt. 147 But to be sure, as Merrill Jensen wrote over 
sixty years ago: 
[There is] almost total ignorance in subsequent times of the clear 
distinction made by eighteenth-century political leaders between the 
tenns "federal" and "national" as applied to central governments. 
Today we use the tenns interchangeably, but the Found[ ers] ... of 1776, 
143. See Jack P. Greene, The Background of the Articles of Confederation, 12 
PUBLlUS: 1. FEDERALISM 15, 43 (1982) ("[T]he location of sovereignty-which has received 
so much stress from modem historians, was ... little emphasized by contemporaries. Much 
more interested in the practical problem of allocating power between the national and the 
state governments, members of Congress simply failed 'to give serious attention' to the 
question of sovereignty."); cf. WOOD, supra note 38, at 354-55 ("The principle of sovereignty 
was not probed and analyzed by Americans in 1776-77 the way it had been in the sixties, 
because whatever the limitations the Confederation may have placed in fact on the individual 
sovereignty of the states, few believed that their union in any theoretical sense contravened 
that sovereignty."); Peter Onuf, Toward Federalism: Virginia, Congress, and the I*stem 
Lands, 34 WM. & MARY Q. 353, 358 (1977) ("Depending on circumstances, a nationalist 
might feel compelled to advocate his state's rights. On the other hand, legislators were able to 
support measures enlarging and strengthening the national power, provided certain essential 
state rights were secured. Indeed, such ambivalence was typicaL"). 
144. See I STORY, supra note 142, § 216, at 159 (quoting Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 
(2 Dall.) 419, 470 (1793»; WOOD, supra note 38, at 355; cf. Greene, supra note 143, at 30 
("In the words of 1.R. Pole, 'the American Colonies developed the characteristics of what 
would later be known as a republican form of government many years before they were to 
claim to be republican in principle.'" (quoting J.R. POLE, THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: THE 
SOURCES OF LEGISLATIVE POWER 69 (1969»). 
145. w.Y. Elliott, Sovereign State or Sovereign Group, 19 AM. POL. SCI. REV, 475, 478 
(1925). 
146. But cf. Jensen, supra note II, at 356-57 ("Historians and political scientists, 
equally with politicians and legal apologists, have interpreted the past in terms of present 
hopes and desires. As a result, many questionable generalizations concerning the nature of 
the American Revolution and its constitutional history have come to be accepted as fact."). 
147. Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-18 (1936) 
(discussing the origin of national powers). 
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and the quite different set of Found[ers] ... of 1787, suffered from no 
such confusion. If we are to believe what they said, they believed that a 
federal government was one created by equal and independent states 
who delegated to it sharply limited authority and who remained 
superior to it in every way. They believed that a national government 
was a central organization with coercive authority over both the states 
and their citizens. They expressed these beliefs as clearly in 1776 as 
they did in 1787, and they acted accordingly.148 
At least to the American leaders of the Revolution, national authority 
had a particular meaning and significance.149 This national authority 
manifested itself in several ways, including the Foreign Affairs Power. 
B. The Foreign Affairs Power 
The Foreign Affairs Power exercised by the Continental Congress 
during the national period looks much different than the current power 
exercised by the President. 150 Despite arguments raised by the 
President in lfnmgstown(the Steel SeizurecaseYSI and again in Hamdi 
v. Rumsfelds2 that the President retains extensive, inherent authority 
limited only by the ballot box and the congressional power of 
impeachment,IS3 the Court does not take much stock in these 
arguments. 154 For the most part, the Court can locate a constitutional 
provision or a congressional delegation or prohibition that controls in 
the foreign affairs cases,ISS meaning that the application of the national 
148. Jensen, supra note II, at 357; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 243 (James 
Madison) ("The act, therefore, of establishing a constitution will not be a national act but a 
federal act."). 
149. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 148, at 243. 
150. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 US. 579, 
585 (1952); Curtiss- Wright, 541 US. at 318. 
151. See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, The Steel Seizure Case: One of a Kind?, 19 
CaNsT. COMMENT 63, 68-69 (2002) (quoting an exchange between Assistant Attorney 
General Homer Baldridge and Judge Pine); Richard M. Pious, Inherent War and Executive 
Powers and Prerogative Politics, 37 PREs. STUD. Q. 66, 73 (2007) (same). 
152. See 542 US. 507, 540-41 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, 
concurring in judgment) (describing the representations made by the govemment's counsel 
during oral argument). 
153. See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Onginal 
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 167,174,303-04 (1996). 
154. Steel Seizure, 343 US. at 585-87 (holding in part that the President does not have 
the implied authority to seize private property due to the aggregation of enumerated executive 
powers). 
155. Eg., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2825 n.2 (2006) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) ("Although the President very well may have inherent authority to try unlawful 
combatants for violations of the law of war before military commissions, we need not decide 
that question because Congress has authorized the President to do so."); Hamdi, 542 US. at 
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authority discussed in Curtiss- Wright is unnecessary.156 In short, there 
has been no reason to revisit the national period for a fresh analysis of 
the national Foreign Affairs Power. 
Of course, if the Court were to adopt Justice Jackson's three-
tiered approach to Executive power in foreign affairs,'57 as amended in 
part by Justice Souter's opinion in Ham~that "in a moment of 
genuine emergency, when the Government must act with no time for 
deliberation, the Executive may be able to detain a citizen if there is 
reason to fear he is an imminent threat to the safety of the Nation and 
its people.,,'58 But, other than the immediate, credible threat of invasion 
or massive attack'59 or the emergency situation requiring the detention 
of an individual described by Justice Souter,16O this question is 
academic. It simply has not come up since 1936. 161 In Professor 
Lofgren's words, "By being available as authoritative precedent, 
[ Curtiss- Wngh~ decreases the need to confront directly certain basic 
constitutional issues.,,'62 Curtiss- Wnght serves its purposes for the 
time being.'63 
This Subpart will revisit Curtiss- Wnght's tale of history with an 
eye to the period of time I refer to above as the national period and 
comparisons to the confederal and federal periods. As Louis Henkin 
put it, Justice Sutherland's "history, in particular, has been challenged, 
and surely it is not manifestly all his way .... But Sutherland's view of 
the locus of sovereignty between 1776 and 1789 has strong support; 
and-what Sutherland's critics have largely overlooked-{;hallenging 
his history does not necessarily destroy his constitutional doctrine."'64 
518-24 (plurality opinion) (finding the authorization for use of military force as authorizing 
the detention of Harndi). 
156. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2!l25 n.2. 
157. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
158. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 552 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, 
concurring in judgment) (referencing Justice Jackson's opinion in the Steel Seizure Case). 
159. But cf. Arthur S. Miller & H. Bart Cox, Congress, the Constitution, and First Use 
of Nuclear U0apons, 48 REv. POL. 211, 212 (1986) (arguing for Congress to regain the 
delegated authority to use nuclear weapons from the President). 
160. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 552. 
161. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
162. Lofgren, supra note 21, at 29. 
163. See KOH, supra note 21, at 94 ("Among government attorneys, Justice 
Sutherland's lavish description of the president's powers is so often quoted that it has come to 
be known as the "'Curtiss- Wright, so I'm right" cite'-a statement of deference to the 
president so sweeping as to be worthy of frequent citation in any government foreign-affairs 
brief."); Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE LJ. 2350, 2355 n.15 (2006) 
(same). 
164. HENKIN, supra note 30, at 19 (footnote omitted). This Article will focus on the 
period prior to the ratification of the Articles in 1781, but it is interesting to note that 
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1. The Rise and Fall of National Sovereignty 
Prior to the advent of general war with Great Britain, the 
Continental Congress's charge was to make peace with the King and 
Parliament. 165 Economic and political elites had no qualms about 
rousing the "mob" from its slumber to challenge the authority of the 
imperials on certain economic and political questions,166 but once the 
fundamental relationship between Britain and the American colonies 
seemed on the brink of elemental change-from one of dependence to 
one of independence-many of America's elites wanted to back 
away. 167 Independence from Britain's military umbrella and protection, 
for example, was not the original intention of the colonial instigators. 168 
Merrill Jensen noted that Gouverneur Morris was concerned that the 
people "could not be fooled forever" and "the aristocracy would lose 
all power and be ruled by a riotous mob."169 Moreover, the American 
political elites that argued in favor of state sovereignty often tended to 
be more concerned with their own personal interests than in the 
interests of their state,170 despite claims to the contrary that Americans 
identified with a state. 171 It was the protection of private property that 
most concerned the elites. I72 
Professor Henkin also questions the locus of sovereignty during the confederal period under 
the Articles. 
165. Van Tyne, supmnote 141, at 530. 
166. Cf. Jensen, supra note II, at 360 (noting Gouverneur Morris's opinion that "the 
mob now had leaders of its own"). 
167. See, e.g., OP-uf, supm note 143, at 359-61. 
168. See Peter S. Onuf, From Colony to Territory: Changing Concepts of Statehood in 
Revolutionary Amenca, 97 POL. SCI. Q. 447,449 (1982) ("Patriots insisted that their claims 
were not imcompatible [sic] with the imperial connection or with loyalty to the crown."). 
169. Jensen, supra note 11, at 360 ("In the years just past, he wrote, the aristocracy had 
gulled the mob, but the mob now had leaders of its own and could not be fooled forever. If 
the disputes with Great Britain were to continue, the aristocracy would lose all power and be 
ruled by a riotous mob. Therefore Morris declared himselffor peace at almost any price, for 
he said that the English constitution was the guarantee of the position of the wealthy people in 
the colonies."). 
170. See Onuf, supra note 143, at 361 ("Because Americans juxtaposed sovereignty 
and actual governing authority, they were particularly sensitive to encroachments on their 
individual and collective rights. They were less interested in vesting their governments with 
powers than with protecting themselves-and their sovereignty-from their governments."). 
171. Cf. John C. Ranney, The Bases of Amencan Federalism, 3 WM. & MARy Q. 1,2-3 
(1946) ("Separated as they were by vast distances and abominable roads, unaccustomed to 
travel in other states or to cornmunicate with their inhabitants, living in isolated communities 
which of necessity approximated to self-sufficiency, they had little interest in and little 
knowledge of their neighbors."). 
172. Onuf, supra note 143, at 449-50. 
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Regardless, war came, and rather than face the gallows or 
worse,173 it was clear that the Continental Congress would have to head 
up the American war effort.174 Even prior to the Declaration of 
Independence, which for many observers is the date the colonies 
acquired "sovereignty;' the Continental Congress had already been 
exercising de facto sovereign authority to wage war against the 
Crown. 175 
Justice Sutherland's Curtiss- Wnght opmlOn drew upon the 
national period, arguing that the sovereign authority of the Continental 
Congress during the national period was derived from the Union itself, 
as a "necessary concomitant[] of nationality."176 It was during this 
period of time that the Continental Congress exercised a national 
authority in foreign affairs and war.177 In the more recent era of 
constitutional scholarship, which emphasizes the enumerated powers 
theory of the Constitution over all else,J78 this theory is unpopular. But, 
as this Article will show, there is significant historical proof that the 
Founders in 1776 and even in 1781 and 1789 had no such qualms. 179 
Of course, there is an equally powerful response to the Curtiss-
Wnght claim, if proven; namely, that there was no national 
sovereignty, just a temporary borrowing of the power to wage war with 
the assent of the unified states as a collective. 180 There is evidence that 
at least some of the colonies (but only a minority) reserved sovereign 
authority to make war and to engage in foreign affairs during this 
173. See Curtis Putnam Nettels, The Ongins of the Union and of the States, in 72 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 68, 71 (1963) (describing the 
English penalty for treason, which was worse than mere death). 
174. See Jensen, supra note 11, at 362; Van Tyne, supra note 141, at 535. 
175. See Greene, supra note 143, at 15-16 (citing JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS 
OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 136-45 
(1979». 
176. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-18 (1936). 
177. See Greene, supra note 143, at 15-16. 
178. See, e.g., KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKIN" 
SENSE OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 170 (2006) (arguing that the federal government is one 
of enumerated powers); JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49 (2005); Prakash, supra note 9, at 1103 (noting a belief 
that the federal government is one of enumerated powers). 
179. In at least one case, United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975), the Supreme 
Court rejected claims from "some states ... that they had had sovereignty before the U.S. 
Constitution, as a basis for claiming title to sea-bed off their coasts." HENKIN, supra note 30, 
at 330 n.lO; see also id at 331 n.11 (citing MaIne and Richard B. Murril Morris, The Forging 
of the Union Reconsidered' A Histoncai RefUtation of State Sovereignty over Seabeds, 74 
COLUM. L. REV. 1056 (1974), in support of the nationalist theory). 
180. Van Tyne, supra note 141, at 535 (indicating that the Continental Congress was 
given powers necessary to wage war against Great Britain after reconciliation seemed 
impossible). 
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period. 181 Some states also engaged other nations for "money and 
arms." I 82 Moreover, there is evidence that the states did not form the 
Continental Congress with the intent of creating a nation. 183 Professor 
Van Tyne asserted, "It is manifestly wrong, therefore, to look at the 
First Continental Congress as coming together because of a national 
feeling, because of a desire to form a national state, and therefore to 
ascribe to it governmental powers.,,184 Only two colonies (Maryland 
and North Carolina) sent delegates to the First Continental Congress in 
1774 with the apparent authority to make laws that might bind those 
colonies, but the remainder of the colonies treated the organization as 
"a joint appeal for relief" from the Crown.185 According to Van Tyne, 
"[i]f the instructions to Congress meant anything, the delegates came 
together unauthorized by the people to act as a national government.,,186 
Samuel Beer reported that James Wilson and John Adams asserted a 
theory that "the colonies and Britain were 'distinct states' within the 
empire connected ... only by having the same king.,,187 
But it seems clear that the Second Continental Congress, which 
began meeting in 1775, began to exercise the national authority of a 
sovereign state. 188 Justice Story wrote that the Continental Congress in 
1775 assumed "the exercise of some of the highest functions of 
sovereignty" and in 1776 "took bolder steps and ... authorized general 
hostilities against the persons and property of British subjects.,,189 
181. See id. at 539-40 & n.2. South Carolina expressly reserved these powers; 
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Maryland, Delaware, and Massachusetts impliedly reserved 
these powers. ld. 
182. HENKIN, supra note 30, at 330 n.lO (citing Letter from Benjamin Franklin to 
Congressional Committee for Foreign Affairs (May 26, 1779), in 3 F. WHARlDN, THE 
REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OFTHE U,NITED STATES 192 (1889». 
183. See Van Tyne, supra note 141, at 529-38; see also Beer, supra note 52, at II ("For 
months after Washington took command of the Continental Army in 1775 he and his officers 
daily drank [to] the king's health."). 
184. Van Tyne, supra note 141, at 530. 
185. ld at 530-31. 
186. ld at 532. 
187. Beer, supra note 52, at 12 (quoting James Wilson, Considerations on the Nature 
and Extent of the Legislative Authonty of the British Parliament, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES 
WILSON 745 n. (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) (1774); John Adams, Novang1us; or, a 
History of the Dispute with America, fivm Its Ongin in 1754, to the Present Time, in 4 THE 
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 37-38, 105, 170 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Charles C. 
Little & James Brown 1851». 
188. I SlDRY, supra note 142, § 213, at 156. 
189. ld. §§ 213-214, at 156-57 ("The Congress of 1775 accordingly assumed at once 
. . . the exercise of some of the highest functions of sovereignty. They took measures for 
national defence and resistance; they followed up the prohibitions upon trade and intercourse 
with Great Britain; they raised a'national army and navy, and authorized limited national 
hostilities against Great Britain; they raised money, emitted bills of credit, and contracted 
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Gordon Wood concluded, "The authority of the Continental Congress 
and the Continental Army was in fact so great during the critical years 
of Independence and the war as to provoke a continuing if fruitless 
debate from the nineteenth century to the present over the priority of 
the union or the states.,,190 Professor Van Tyne had to acknowledge that 
while the delegates of the Second Continental Congress may have 
come together without the intent of forming a new nation, "open war 
developed, and the Congress gradually did assume all these powers 
which Story enumerates."191 At some point, the war progressed to a 
point where ''Americans changed the banner under which they were 
fighting, and in place of liberty merely they were aiming at liberty and 
independence.,,192 National authority existed, from wherever derived, 
and the Continental Congress exercised it at least as early as 1775.193 
It was the necessity of a unified war effort that drove the states to 
accept the Continental Congress as the head of a national union that 
would exercise full national authority.194 As Professor Van Tyne was 
forced to recognize: 
To attempt united action by a clumsy system of correspondence was 
impracticable, and the Continental Congress, in which were assembled 
representatives of the sovereign states, was a convenient centre of 
intelligence and a source of advice which would keep their forces 
united. . . . To Congress was yielded a temporary and indefinite 
authority for war purposes .... 195 
debts upon national account; they established a national post-office; and finally they 
authorized captures and condemnations of prizes in prize courts, with a reserve of appellate 
jurisdiction to themselves. The same body, in 1776, took bolder steps and ... authorized 
general hostilities against the persons and property of British subjects; they opened an 
extensive commerce with foreign countries, regulating the whole subject of imports and 
exports; they authorized the fonnation of new governments in the colonies; and finally they 
exercised the sovereign prerogative of dissolving the allegiance of all colonies to the British 
crown."); see also Nettels, supra note 173, at 69-70 ("Before July 2, 1776, the Continental 
Congress adopted a unifonn commercial code, established and maintained a unified anny, 
... issued continental currency, ... sent a diplomatic agent to France, ... and empowered the 
Continental Army ... to inflict the death penalty .... "). 
190. WOOD, supra note 38, at 355. 
191. Van Tyne, supra note 141, at 532-33. 
192. Id at 535. 
193. See SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 57 (New York, Banks & Brothers, Law Publishers 1893) ("The simple truth is, that 
the United States, under the Articles of Confederation, like the United Colonies after the 
battle of Lexington, existed as a Sovereign Power from the necessities of the emergency."); id 
at 58 ("Before the Declaration of Independence it claimed and exercised the National Powers 
which until then had been wielded by the king of Great Britain."). 
194. Id at 57. 
195. Van Tyne, supra note 141,at535. 
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According to Curtis Nettels, "So indispensable was the Union to the 
winning of independence and statehood that Lincoln scarcely 
exaggerated when he said the Union created the States, as States."I96 
American leaders recognized that the states could not exercise the 
necessary authority in a time of general war. 197 However, at least one 
of the delegates to the Continental Congress resolved "to vest the 
Congress with no more Power than is absolutely necessary.,,198 Only 
necessity limited the authority of the national union. And the powers 
created by the necessity tended to "increase[] in direct relation to the 
seriousness of the military danger.,,199 
The Declaration of Independence followed in July 1776, 
notifying the world that the United States would assert (as it had been) 
national sovereign authority.200 Van Tyne concluded that "[t]his I 
conceive to have been the condition in America until the trying 
experiences of the period of the Confederation taught a majority of 
Americans, what a few had long seen, that the whole logic of the 
situation demanded the creation of a national state.,,201 All that 
remained of the argument that the Continental Congress did not exist 
as a nation among nations was semantics.202 As he had with the 
196. Nettels, supra note 173, at 71. 
197. See Greene, supra note 143, at 39 (quoting ANDREW C. McLAUGHLIN, 
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 138 (1961 )). 
198. WOOD, supra note 38, at 359 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also John 
Gorham Palfrey, The Growth of the Idea of Annexation, and Its Bearing upon Constitutional 
Law, 13 HARv. L. REv. 371, 376 (1900) ("The necessities of the revolution gave new strength 
.... "). 
I 99. Ranney, supra note 171, at 15. 
200. I JOHN W BURGESS, POLmCAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 100-01 (Boston, Ginn & Co. 1893) ("[A] people testified thereby the consciousness of 
the fact that they had become, in the progressive development of history, one whole, separate, 
and adult nation, and a national state, and that they were determined to defend this natural 
status against the now no longer natural supremacy of a foreign state. . .. The American 
state, organized in the Continental Congress, proclaimed to the world its sovereign existence, 
and proceeded ... to authorize the people resident within the separate colonies to make 
temporary arrangement for their local government, upon the basis of the widest possible 
suffrage."). 
201. Van Tyne, supra note 141, at 544 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
202. I STORY, supra note 142, §§ 214-215, at 157-58 ("[A]t the moment of their 
separation [the states] were under the dominion of a superior controlling national government 
whose powers were vested in and exercised by the general Congress with the consent of the 
people of all the States. From the moment of the Declaration of Independence, if not for 
most purposes at an antecedent period, the united colonies must be considered as being a 
nation de meto . . .. The powers of that government were not, and indeed could not be, well 
defined. But still its exclusive sovereignty ... and its controlling power over the States was in 
most, if not in all, national measures universally admitted." (footnotes omitted)); see also 
Greene, supra note 143, at 15-16 ("From the beginning, American leaders were aware that 
they had no chance of success unless they could maintain a high degree of agreement on the 
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national powers exercised by the Continental Congress in 1775 and 
early 1776, Justice Story enumerated the national powers that body 
exercised from the time of the Declaration until the ratification of the 
Articles.203 
Because the Supreme Court has not taken the opportunity in 
recent times to revisit Curtiss- Wright in any significant fashion,204 the 
question of whether preconstitutional national authority exists in the 
United States afterthe ratification of the Articles and the Constitution 
remains open, but not subject to closure any time soo~ one would 
suspect. For purposes of this Article, I will assume' that Justice 
Sutherland and Justice Story were correct in their conclusions, at least 
during the national period from 1776 to 1781, that the Continental 
Congress exercised a national power derived from the status of the 
united colonies as a nation. 
It appears that the national authority exercised by the Continental 
Congress during the national period existed for only a brief time; in 
essence, the period of time a necessity existed (the war). Although the 
historical record is not conclusive, one possibility is that the war 
powers of the Continental Congress rose and fell with the necessity of 
engaging Great Britain in general war. Once the conflict developed 
into an all-out war with the King in 1776, it could be argued that the 
Continental Congress exercised the entire bundle of sov.ereign rights 
that any foreign nation with an undivided head exercises.205 But once 
the conflict receded, especially in the months following the Battle of 
Yorktown in 1781 and during the debates leading to the ratification of 
the Articles of Confederation,206 the war and foreign policy power of 
the Continental Congress-no longer as necessary-receded as well: 
principles and tactics of opposition and avoid the types of jealousy that had troubled 
American resistance in the early 1770s. Inexorably, this awareness pushed delegates to the 
Continental Congress in the direction of a system in which Congress exerted extraordinarily 
extensive power, and thereby constituted a de facto national government." (internal quotation 
marks omitted». 
203. I SlORY, supm note 142, § 215, at 158-59 ("Among the exclusive powers 
exercised by Congress were the power to declare war and make peace; to authorize captures; 
to institute appellate prize courts; to direct and control all national, military, and naval 
operations; to RJ/111 alliances and make treaties, to contract debts, and issue bills of credit 
upon national accoUnt. In respect to foreign governments, we were politically known as the 
United States only; and it IillS in our national capacity, as such, that we sent and received 
ambassadors, [and] entered into treaties and alliances . ... " (emphasis added». 
204. See HENKIN, supm note 30, at 332 n.16. 
205. I SlORY, supmnote 142, § 213, at 157. 
206. Cf. Jensen, supm note II, at 373 ("The battle of Yorktown in the fall of 1781 and 
thc peace negotiations undcr way gave no joy to the nationalists. Their arguments for 
centralization and the supposed efficiency and economy that would result depended heavily 
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Wood has shown that the end of the JVc'U produced a reassertion of state 
authonty and a corresponding diminution of central power, a 
development marked by a revival of that traditional distrust of remote 
power that had been so evident in the controversy with Britain in the 
1760s and early 1770s and would be such a conspicuous feature of the 
debate over the Constitution of 1787.207 
By the time the states ratified the Articles, little or no necessary 
national power in foreign affairs (with the exception of the treaty 
power, perhaps) remained with the Continental Congress.208 The 
necessity that gave rise to the national authority receded and, with it, 
the power.209 By the time the 1781 Founders and the 1789 Founders 
ratified the Articles and the Constitution respectively, the people had 
made decisions on different means of allocating the· Foreign Affairs 
Power by enumerating specific foreign affairs powers to the new 
government(s).210 As the next Subpart shows, the new organic 
documents all but eliminated the national Foreign Affairs Power. 
2. The Articles and the Constitution 
The Articles of Confederation, much like the Constitution, 
granted broad and exclusive authority to the national government to 
deal in foreign affairs to the exclusion of the states.2I1 This authority, as 
noted above, is the confederal power exercised by the national 
government from 1781 to 1789.212 Jack Rakove noted: 
The sphere allotted to Congress was primarily concerned with war and 
diplomacy, the great affairs of state. That given to the states involved 
matters of 'internal police' which ... were understood in fairly broad 
terms. 
on the continuance of the war, and they knew it. . .. Robert Morris . . . declared that he 
would welcome peace so that he might be rid of his job but that, if he were to speak as a 
patriot, he would wish that the war would continue until the central government acquired 
more power."). 
207. Greene, supra note 143, at 44 (emphasis added) (citing WOOD, supra note 38, at 
355, 464, 580); see MILLER, supra note 193, at 58 ("It is true that in the interim between the 
ratification of the Treaty of Peace, and the adoption of the Constitution, there was a time 
when the desire for union weakened."). 
208. Greene, supra note 143, at 44. 
209. Seeid. 
210. See Rakove, supra note 136, at 52, 63. 
211. See id. at 52. 
212. Seeid. 
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War, foreign relations, the regulation of interstate and foreign 
commerce, the organization of the national domain: these remained the 
essence of national affairs [under the Articles].213 
While there may be some debate on the subject, Professor Henkin 
concludes that "[o]n the whole there is perhaps no disagreement that, 
under the Articles, the states retained no external sovereignty.,,214 
The Foreign Affairs Power under the Constitution, likewise, is 
shared between the President and Congress to the exclusion of the 
states.215 There is the question---despite Justice Sutherland's intent to 
answer it in Curtiss- Wnghr-whether the federal government retains 
a portion of that preconstitutional authority that the Continental 
Congress exercised during the Revolution. While the President has, on 
occasion, asserted an executive power to wage war in an emergency 
situation that would exceed the authority that has been delegated by 
Congress to the Presidenfl7-and has even asserted that Article II is a 
grant of plenary power in all things executive218-the Court's meager 
jurisprudence in this field has not required the final disposition of the 
question.219 
It would appear that the necessity that had existed from as early 
as 1775 through the end of major combat operations after the 1781 
Battle of Yorktown did not compel the Framers of the Articles of 
Confederation or the Constitution to maintain a national plenary power 
over foreign affairs.22o These documents granted extensive and 
exclusive authority to handle all foreign relations, leaving no 
substantial (or extremely limited) preconstitutional foreign affairs 
authority.22I Moreover, the original understanding of the 1789 Framers 
appears to strongly disfavor an executive with the capacity to exercise 
inherent, extraconstitutional authority.222 . Louis Fisher quoted John 
Jay's Federalist No. 4 as virtual proof: "[M]onarchs in other nations 
'will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for 
213. Jd at 52, 63. 
214. HENKIN, supmnote 30, at 330 n.lO. 
215. SeeRakove, supmnote 136, at 52, 63. 
216. 299 u.s. 304, 317-18 (1936). 
217. Eg., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I, 18-25 (1942); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 
Black) 635, 690-95 (1863). 
218. See Devins & Fisher, supm note 151, at 67-69; Pious, supm note 151, at 73. 
219. HENKIN, supm note 30, at 332 n.16 (noting that the Supreme Court has not 
further visited Sutherland's theory). 
220. SeeJensen, supmnote II, at 37. 
221. But cf HENKIN, supm note 30, at 14-16 (identifYing the existence and acceptance 
of plenary authority). 
222. See Fisher, supmnote I, at 7,10; Prakash & Ramsey, supmnote 30, at 236. 
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purposes and objects merely personal, such as a thirst for military 
glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to 
aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans."'223 
Where does that leave Curtiss- Wnghf? Justice Sutherland's 
theory has some merit, but he probably was only partially correct. The 
balance of evidence tends to suggest that the Continental Congress did 
exercise a national power during the Revolutionary War, but that the 
national power faded and the requirements of the war effort faded as 
the combatants reached the end of hostilities.224 "The great 
contribution of [military necessity] was the earlier building of 
institutions And habits of co-operation and the stimulating of a national 
patriotism which endured longer than the military threat itself,,225 It 
appears that by the time of the ratification of the Constitution, military 
necessity no longer preoccupied the Founders.226 The national power 
exercised by the Continental Congress during the national penod of 
sovereignty~ existed only so fong as the necessity for national power 
existed '. 
The Articles and the Constitution both provided a complete 
measure of foreign affairs and war powers for the national government 
to exercise in accordance with the wishes of the people.227 It stands to 
reason that the national powers that existed prior to the ratification of 
these organic documents were subsumed into the authority delegated 
by the people to the United States. With the possible exception of an 
emergency along the lines of an invasion or an imminent devastating 
attack that would recreate the necessity that existed during the 
Revolution, the United States no longer retains national power in 
foreign affairs. 
Where does that leave the Indian Affairs Power? What the 
following Part will demonstrate is that the history and original 
understanding of the Indian Affairs Power differs dramatically from 
that of the Foreign Affairs Power. 
223. Fisher, supra note I, at 7 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 4, at 101 (John Jay)). 
224. Jensen, supra note JI, at 373. 
225. Ranney, supra note 171, at 33. 
226. Id ("Military necessity, far from being a decisive element in the final 
achievement of union, was of remarkably little consequence."). 
227. Fisher, supra note I, at 7 (suggesting that because the Framers were conscious of 
abusive executive actions, they designed the Constitution so that an appeal to "inherent 
authority" would be unnecessary). 
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Iv. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATIONAL INDIAN 
AFFAIRS POWER 
543 
The Indian Affairs Power may be another story. Justice Breyer's 
dictum in Lara that the United States (namely, Congress) retains a 
national Indian Affairs Power became the culmination of a debate that 
has simmered off and on from the time of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Umted States v. Kagama. 228 One suspects that because, like 
Curtiss- Wnght's holding that the United States holds as much foreign 
affairs and war powers as necessary to defend the nation avoids 
ongoing constitutional debate, the Court's long-standing recognition of 
federal plenary power in Indian affairs does the same in 'the arena of 
the Indian Affairs Power.229 Because there have been no serious 
constitutional concerns that would require the Court to reexamine 
congressional authority in the field of Indian affairs, there has been no 
reason to seriously reexamine the source of that authority. Of course, 
at virtually any time, the Court might be confronted with the need to 
undertake that examination. This Article offers a launching point for a 
historical examination of the original understanding of the Indian 
Affairs Power in the context of the Lara dictum.230 
The Indian Affairs Power serves as the foundation for a large 
portion of Indian affairs legislation and regulation.23I Of course, a 
significant portion of the congressional enactments and Executive 
regulation in the field can be traced to the Indian Commerce Clause or 
to an Indian treaty provision that expressly authorizes the action, but 
this body of law only accounts for something less than the entire body 
of Indian affairs law.232 As Justice Blackmun worried in an analogous 
context, should the Court hold that the federal government's Indian 
Affairs Power is constricted, much of Title 25 of the United States 
Code could lose its footing and come crashing down.233 In short, the 
228. 118 US. 375 (1886). 
229. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 US. 304, 318 (1936). 
230. See United States v. Lara, 541 US. 193,200-0 I (2004). 
231. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 US. 535, 552 (1974). 
232. Id 
233. Id at 552-53 ("Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and 
reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing with the [Bureau of Indian Affairs], single 
out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations. If 
these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians, 
were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25 
US.c.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward 
the Indians would be jeopardized.") (citing Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F. Supp. 808, 
814 n.13 (E.D. Wash. 1965), affll, 384 US. 209 (1966». 
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authority to enact these statutes must exist somewhere if the Indian 
Commerce Clause comes up shore34 
An important question-perhaps the most important question for 
purposes of the argument contained in this Article-is whether the 
Articles of Confederation or the Constitution extinguished forever the 
national Indian Affairs Power exercised by the Continental Congress. 
No Supreme Court cases have addressed this question, but if Justice 
Breyer's Lara dictum will prevail, it must be answered in the 
negative.235 Only one federal court case has addressed even the 
drafting of the Indian affairs clause in the Articles, Oneida Indian 
Nation of New JfJrk v. New JfJrk236 That analysis focused only on the 
Indian affairs authority intended by the Framers of the Articles to be 
reserved and/or granted to the states and is of limited utility in this 
Article.237 However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, in dicta, stated: 
We recognize, however, that Indian affairs do not fall neatly into the 
category of either international or domestic matters, and it is surely 
arguable that on matters concerning war and peace with the Indians, the 
national government [from 1776 to 1781] did possess the inherent 
powers that Curtiss- Wright ascribed to the national government in the 
realm of traditionally "international" matters.238 
Justice Breyer's Lara dictum, while resting in part on the fact that 
much of the United States' dealings with Indian tribes has been in the 
context of war or foreign affairs,239 does have a historical basis outside 
of the context of foreign affairs.24o The Indian Affairs Power may exist 
as a national power that predates and survives the Constitution and the 
Articles of Confederation. The Continental Congress possessed and 
exercised an Indian Affairs Power from 1776 to 1781.241 Unlike the 
234. CfElIiott, supra note 145, at 496 ("The legal sovereignty of government ... must 
be capable of being determined constitutionally, though its locus may be widened or 
narrowed Matters which transcend the purpose which government exists to realize under the 
constitutional mandate may be referred to an arbitrament outside the bounds of a narrowly 
conceived Austinian doctrine, and matters which are the special concern of local areas or 
specific interests will properly be left in their hands." (emphasis added)). 
235. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193,200-02 (2004). 
236. 860 F.2d 1145, 1155-61 (2d Cir. 1988). 
237. ld at 1155-61. 
238. ld at 1161. 
239. Lara, 541 U.S. at 200. 
240. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS: 
THE INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS: 1790-1834, at 27-30 (1962) (finding that the 
Continental Congress possessed and exercised an Indian Affairs Power from 1776 to 1781). 
241. Seeid 
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Foreign Affairs Power, which was all but subsumed into the Articles 
and then the Constitution, a strong argument can be made that the 
Indian Affairs Power has never been fully subsumed into these 
governing documents. 
A. Founde~'JTeoccupanons 
National authority derived from the people's sovereignty during 
the time of the national period originated in the necessities of the 
Revolutionary War and, in some respects, the important questions that 
continued unanswered after the conclusion of major combat 
operations. The Founders believed that there could have been other 
necessities that created national power during the national period.242 
For example, Alexander Hamilton and others sought to create a 
national debt for which no individual state would take responsibility, 
but would have to be dealt with on a national leve1.243 Under this 
theory, which came to partial fruition through the Articles and the 
Constitution, the states would be bound together by the necessity of 
paying off a national debt. 244 There were at least two other independent 
necessities that brought the colonies together as a nation prior to the 
ratification of the Articles that are relevant to this Article-the 
relationship of Indian tribes to the United States and the states and the 
related question of the Western lands. 
1. Indian Tribes 
An important necessity that occupied the Continental Congress 
during the Revolution was the potential for military intervention in the 
conflict by Indian tribes.245 The Continental Congress worried that the 
British would enter into a treaty with the Western tribes, especially the 
Six Nations ofHaudenosaunee and the Indians of the Great Lakes and 
Ohio River Valley region, and those tribes would take up arms against 
the Americans.246 Given the relative military weakness of the 
Americans in the early years of the Revolutionary War and the fear of 
Indian-style guerrilla warfare, the Continental Congress treated the 
242. SeeJensen, supra note II, at 366-68. 
243. /d 
244. /d 
245. See Clinton, supra note 105, at 118. 
246. See Andrew McFarland Davis, The Employment of Indian Auxiliaries in the 
American War, 2 ENG. HIST. REv. 709, 709-10, 713 (1887). See genera/IyWALTER H. MOHR, 
FEDERAL INDIAN RELATIONS 1774-1788, at 37-39 (1933) (discussing the debates of the 
Continental Congress on "[w]hether the Indian was to participate in the impending war"). 
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situation with grave concern.247 The Continental Congress had another 
reason to fear the Indian tribes-they had a much better relationship 
with the British than with the Americans, who the Indian tribes viewed 
as a vicious and hungry competitor to their lands.248 The British Indian 
agents lobbied Indian tribes all along the Western frontier to fight 
against the Americans.249 The Continental Congress had little choice 
but to deal with the Indian tribes, seeking either alliances or tribal 
neutrality,250 as the piecemeal efforts of the individual colonies failed.25I 
The exercise of a national Indian Affairs Power derived from the 
necessities of the Revolution.252 As Father Prucha explained: 
In the end, the over-all necessities of Indian control prevailed, for, as 
James Wilson pointed out, the Indians refused to recognize any superior 
authority and only the United States in Congress assembled could have 
any hope of dealing with them in an adequate fashion. Above all else, 
rivalries between colonies in treating with the Indians had to be 
avoided.253 
Many of the first treaties between the nascent nation and Indian tribes 
were treaties of military alliance or nonintervention and cooperation.254 
In the Treaty of Fort Pitt with the Delaware Nation, for example, "it 
was agreed that all past offenses were to be mutually forgiven, peace 
247. See Davis, supra note 246, at 709-26. 
248. See PRUCHA, supra note 240, at 27; Davis, supra note 246, at 712 (describing the 
various methods, including massive fraud and violence, used by Americans to dispossess 
Indian lands). 
249. See PRUCHA, supra note 240, at 27; Davis, supra note 246, at 716-17. 
250. See MOHR, supra note 246, at 37-38; Davis, supra note 246, at 714, 719. See 
generally I VINE DELORIA, JR. & RAYMOND 1. DEMALLIE, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN INDIAN 
DIPLOMACY: TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND CONVENTIONS, 1775-1979, at 12-13, 15-82 (1999) 
(listing and describing twelve treaties during the Revolutionary War period). 
251. PRUCHA, supra note 240, at 27 ("The colonists ... could not afford to let Indian 
matters drift, and individual colonies sent commissioners to the Indians. The Indian problem, 
however, could not be handled adequately by disparate provincial practices, and on July 12, 
1775, the Continental Congress inaugurated a federal Indian policy with a report from a 
committee on Indian affairs."); see 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, 
at 198 (1905) [hereinafter JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS]. 
252. See PRUCHA, supra note 240, at 30. 
253. ld (emphasis added); see also Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian 
Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REv. 1055, 1098 (1995) ("The threat that the Indian tribes of 
the northern, western, and southern frontiers might ally themselves with the English 
produced a rash of congressional action designed to assure the neutrality of the tribes."); 
Clinton, supra note 105, at 118 ("During the American Revolution, the Continental Congress 
sought to out-position British military contingents. The British presence in Canada and the 
Crown's forts and other outposts on the St. Lawrence and on the Great Lakes constituted one 
of the major threats to the Continental Army led by George Washington."). 
254. See generally MOHR, supra note 246, at 37-91 (describing the attempts made by 
Americans and British with regard to entering into treaties with Indians). 
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was established, and in case of war each party was to assist the 
other."m In general, however, the Continental Congress was mostly 
unsuccessful in treating with Indian nations during the Revolution to 
the extent that they could not reach alliances or guarantee neutrality.256 
According to Walter Mohr, there were significant reasons why the 
Indians sided with the British, including the fact that "the Americans 
were desirous, mainly, of depriving the Indians of their lands."257 
Ultimately, the tribal assaults on American towns did little to influence 
the outcome of the war.258 In the South, especially, American military 
victories against the Indian tribes were substantial.259 
This exercise of necessary national authority by the Continental 
Congress served as the leading focal point of what can now be referred 
to as the Indian Affairs Power, although, to be sure, the attempt to treat 
with, and then the fighting against, Indian tribes also are examples of 
the exercise of the Foreign Affairs Power. According to John Ranney, 
"Probably the most persistent of the active factors promoting co-
operation in America was military necessity. . .. [E]ach of the early 
attempts at union was the direct consequence of some military threat 
[from, for example] the Indians .... "260 The exercise of this national 
authority by the Continental Congress is part of the origin of the Indian 
Affairs Power, a power that the national sovereign appeared to inherit 
from the King.26 I After the Revolution ended, the necessity of dealing 
with the Indian tribes remained.262 Perhaps this is where the Indian 
Affairs Power made its clearest, independent debut. No one had 
forgotten the near-successful war waged by Pontiac in 1763263-and 
the possibility of another offensive. According to Walter Mohr, "The 
Indians are not mentioned in the treaty of 1783, yet they were a very 
influential factor in the negotiations.,,264 John Marshall recalled 
decades later in a private letter to Justice Story how the American 
255. Id at 73; see Treaty of Fort Pitt with the Delaware Nation, supra note 87, at 13; 
DELORIA & DEMALLlE, supra note 250, at 11-12; Clinton, supra note 105, at 118-20. 
256. See MOHR, supra note 246, at 87-88 (noting that Indians historically allied 
themselves with the British). 
257. See id at 40. 
258. See id at 87. 
259. See ld at 60. 
260. Ranney, supra note 171, at 14. 
261. See Jack N. Rakove, Taking the Prerogative Out of the Presidency: An 
On'ginaiist Perspective, 37 PRES. STUD. Q. 85, 92 (2007) (discussing authorities who made 
this claim). 
262. See Clinton, supra note 253, at 1105. 
263. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL 
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 236-37 (\990). 
264. MOHR, supra note 246, at 93. 
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leadership continued to fear an Indian offensive that could all but drive 
the nascent American nation into the sea.265 If anything, immediately 
after the hostilities with Britain ceased, perhaps the necessity 
increased, given that some powerful Indian tribes that had historically 
sided with the British were either concerned that the Americans would 
soon move against them or were continuing to agitate against the 
Continental Congress with British support.266 In addition, even the 
economic interests of New York and Pennsylvania in tapping into the 
Indian fur trade required union, as one antifederalist pointed oue67 
A proposed amendment to Article IX, Clause Four, of the 
Articles of Confederation illustrates that the intent of the Framers-at 
one point-was to vest the entire Indian Affairs Power in the United 
States.268 However, the infamous proviso preserving the rights of state 
legislatures dampened-if not obliterated-that original intent.269 The 
debates of the Framers of the Articles of Confederation in the Indian 
affairs context were disjointed and inconclusive.270 It appears that the 
final provision ratified in 1781 consisted of the squeezing together a 
combination of the nationalists' proposed language and the 
antifederalists' proposed language-without serious consideration of 
the impact it would have on the meaning of the final provision. As 
265. See RICHARD C. BROWN, ILLUSTRlOusAMERICANS: JOHN MARsHALL 213 (1868) 
("The Indians were a fierce and dangerous enemy whose love of war made them sometimes 
the aggressors, whose nwnbers and habits made them formidable, and whose cruel system of 
warfare seemed to justify every endeavor to remove them to a distance from civilized 
settlements." (quoting 1828 letter from Chief Justice Marshall to Justice Story)); ROBERT 
KENNETH FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARsHALL 54-55 (1968) ("Instead 
[Marshall] excused the displacement which had occurred by the most narrow argwnent 
possible: the Indians' war-like savagery made their physical proximity a mortal danger to the 
conquering settlers, and only to the extent of that danger might their lands be appropriated." 
(emphasis added)). Contra Ranney, supra note 1 71, at 15 ("Only in Georgia, which was 
engaged in an Indian war, was defense an important motive for ratification [of the 
Constitution]."). 
266. C£ MOHR, supra note 246, at 93 ("The Indians clung tenaciously to that which 
the Americans desired most. Undoubtably [sic] this resistance was strengthened by the hope 
of British resistance should matters come to a crisis"). See generally id at 118-21. 
267. See Ranney, supra note 171, at 15 ("New York and Pennsylvania anxiously look 
fOIWard for [sic] the fur trade. How can they obtain it but by union?" (quoting William 
Grayson in the Virginia Convention, 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON 
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 278 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. 1901))). 
268. See Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1155-57 (2d Cir. 
1988). 
269. See id at 1145 (holding that New York had the power to purchase Indian land 
without the consent of Congress). 
270. See id at 1156-57; Clinton, supra note 253, at 1139-47. 
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famously noted by James Madison, Article IX, Clause Four was 
"obscure and contradictory.,,271 
As to whether the national Indian Affairs Power that the 
Continental Congress exercised during the time of the national period 
survived the ratification of the Articles, the answer appears to be that 
the intent of the 1781 Founders was to vest the entire array of Indian 
Affairs Power(s) in the nation, with protection of the interests of the 
state legislatures. No national authority appears to have been left out 
or reserved.272 The Framers, it appears, subsumed the entire national 
Foreign Affairs Power into the Articles. Of course, they did a very 
poor job of it. 
By the time of the framing of the Constitution, the 1789 Founders 
moved away from vesting any reserved authority in the states.273 The 
1789 Founders' clear intent, as Professor Clinton showed in his 
comprehensive historical research, was to divest the states of any and 
all Indian Affairs Power.274 But where the Constitution reserves 
exclusive authority to the United States, it did not use the magic words 
that would vest the entire national Indian Affairs Power with 
Congress.27S Herein rests one of the biggest puzzles of federal Indian 
law-why did the 1789 Founders not keep language similar to the 
Articles of Confederation (leaving out the proviso); language that 
would have appeared to vest the entire Indian Affairs Power in 
Congress? 
Instead, the 1789 Founders vested Congress with the power to 
regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.276 By negative implication, it 
would appear Congress does not have the authority to exercise the 
entire national Indian Affairs Power that it had under the Articles, 
subject to the proviso.277 While Congress has extensive authority in 
this vein,278 there is reasonable skepticism that Congress's authority as 
271. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 284-85 (James Madison). 
272. Clinton, supra note 253, at 1155 (describing James Madison's views of federal 
power). 
273. See id at 1164. 
274. See Clinton, supra note 105, at 149 (noting that the history of the adoption of 
constitutional provisions suggests Congress wanted to ensure that no power over Indian 
Affairs was left to the states). 
275. Prakash, supra note 9, at 1089. 
276. U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
277. See Prakash, supra note 9, at 1089. 
278. But cf. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378 (1886) ("The Constitution of 
the United States is almost silent in regard to the relations of the government which was 
established by it to the numerous tribes of Indians within its borders."). 
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derived from the Indian Commerce Clause alone is plenary.279 But the 
story of the Indian Affairs Power remains incomplete. 
2. The Western Lands and Expansion 
In 1763, in part as a response to the shocking success of the war 
waged by Indian military forces led by the Ottawa ogema Pontiac,280 
the Crown issued a proclamation prohibiting anyone from purchasing 
Indian lands west of a boundary line set at the Allegheny Mountains-
the infamous Norman Yoke.281 The Proclamation of 1763, and its 
subsequent arbitrary enforcement and alteration, became one of the 
flashpoints of the American Revolution.282 After the Battle of Yorktown 
diminished the necessary war powers of the Continental Congress, the 
interrelated questions of the Western boundaries, state Western land 
claims, and the expansion of the nation-all of which had its origins in 
British imperial policy and that also implicated the nation's Indian 
affairs--created an additional outlet for the exercise of national 
authority.283 Another related major concern relevant to this Article that 
drove the states together is the question of the Western lands and the 
expansion of the United States. Before the states could trust the 
national government in regard to their interests, they had to trust each 
other.284 And before they could trust each other, they had to rely upon a 
national government. The disputes that the states had with each 
279. See Prakash, supra note 9, at 1089-90. 
280. See WILLIAMS, supra note 263, at 232; Clinton, supra note 253, at 1092. 
281. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 263, at 232-86 (describing the execution of 
the proclamation's scope, enforcement and practical effects); Robert N. Clinton, The 
Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict over the 
Management of Indian Affairs, 69 B.U. L. REv. 329 (1989) (examining the history of the 
proclamation and its effect on the development of modern Indian law). 
282. See WILLIAMS, supra note 263, at 232; cf. Onuf, supra note 143, at 363 ("British 
policy intensified the conflict of interests. White settlement was prohibited beyond the 
Atlantic watershed by the Proclamation of 1763; negotiations with Indians from 1768 to 1770 
pushed the line considerably to the west. . .. But the Indian boundaries confmed most 
speculators and promoters to Virginia'S immediate hinterland."). 
283. See generally Onuf, supra note 143, at 364, 369-74 (highlighting disputes 
between the states and federal govemment over "Western land" and through Virginia'S release 
ofland, the ability of the states and people to find a common ground); Onuf, supra note 168, 
at 451-55 (highlighting that the coming together of states to settle their land disputes resulted 
in the diminishment of that ability and a concomitant strengthening of the federal 
government). 
284. "Maryland ... held back [its ratification of the Articles of Confederation] to 
secure that settlement of the public lands which was eventually made. That State gave its 
assent [the fmal state to do so] in March, 1871." MILLER, supra note 193, at 42. See 
generally Merrill Jensen, The Cession of the Old Northwest, 23 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 27, 
32-48 (1936) (describing disputes between the landed and the landless states). 
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other-the landed states represented by Virginia and the landless states 
represented by Maryland-in addition to the claims of the United 
States, held up the ratification of the Articles for years.2B5 
Only a national sovereign could solve the interstate disputes and 
maintain the solution over time: "[A]ll parties in the western lands 
controversy looked forward to congressional jurisdiction-whatever 
title claims Congress itself could advance-and accepted the notion 
that secure boundaries finally depended on mutual recognition through 
Congress.,,286 According to Merrill Jensen, "[T]he conservatives, led 
by John Dickinson ... insisted on the necessity of centralized authority 
to regulate trade and western lands .... "287 National (or confederal or 
federal) authority was necessary to ensure that states would not 
arbitrarily leave the union over a dispute.28B In Peter Onuf's words, 
"Though recognition is by definition the basis of any state's 
international standing, mutual recognition among the United States 
worked to diminish their independence. The price of recognition was a 
radical diminution of each state's independence in relation to other 
states.,,289 
American political leaders considered the Western lands, in 1776, 
to be "the chief source of potential wealth in the eighteenth century.,,290 
A minority of conservatives in the Continental Congress who 
advocated a powerful national government, were supported in. part by 
land speculators and land companies who stood to profit from these 
lands, sought central, national authority to handle the Western land 
claims.291 In short, as these leaders asserted when Virginia denied 
national authority to handle the Western land claims, "[T]he 
'[ q]uestion of the jurisdiction of Congress' was the very essence of 
their claims, and that it was 'of infinite consequence to the American 
Union as well as to your memorialists.",292 National interest in 
285. See Jensen, supm note 284, at 32-48. 
286. Onuf, supm note 168, at 452; see also id at 453 ("Boundary controversies 
revealed the inadequacy of traditional definitions and coincidentally led to demands for the 
expansion of congressional power. If boundaries were not fixed, government itself was 
impossible."). 
287. Jensen,supmnote II,at362. 
288. SeeOnuf, supmnote 168, at 45 I. 
289. Id at 452. 
290. Jensen, supm note II, at 362; see also Onuf, supm note 143, at 358 ("The 
national domain was to be (or so it was thought) a source of virtually unlimited financial and 
political power for Congress."). 
291. Jensen, supm note II, at 364-65 (citing Jensen, supm note 284, at 27-48). 
292. Id at 366 (quoting Papers of the Continental Congress, Oct. 13, 1780). 
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acquiring title to Western lands was preferable to landed states being 
forced to share or submit to landless states. 
According to Peter Onuf, Virginia's refusal to back down from its 
claims to the Western lands described in its charter created a conflict 
between the national union and the states that helped to solidify (and 
perhaps even create) the federalism that distinguishes the American 
Republic.293 Virginia had established its boundaries in its Constitution 
of 1776 that extended well into the Old Northwest and joined the 
national union only upon reserving "her distinct rights of Sovereignty 
and Soil."294 The crisis involving Virginia's claims-unresolved until 
1784----0ffered a unique opportunity for both the State to leverage its 
sovereignty by forcing the national union to recognize it, and for the 
United States to solidify its authority over national boundaries and 
Western land claims and, by extension, reserve the power to expand the 
nation by adding new states.295 The Western lands and the territorial 
claims of the landed colonies were a critical source of conflict with 
nonlanded states that only a sovereign national authority could 
resolve.296 
The expansion of the nation, adding additional states to the 
original thirteen, also become an important reason for the states to 
accept a national government.297 As Peter Onufwrote: 
The new western states would only come into being, however, by 
assimilation to higher authority, through recognition by the existing 
states, and by admission to the union. New state claims were premised 
on a rejection of particular colony-state claims and the consequent 
elevation of a congressional title to unlocated lands. A union than 
included these new political communities, as territories or states, was 
necessarily a different kind of union than that which bound the original 
states.298 
As with the recognition of Western land claims, the question of new 
states required a national authority to compel obedience to the whole 
and quell additional conflict: "Challenges to state jurisdiction, 
293. See Onuf, supra note 143, at 368-74. 
294. Id at 368 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
295. Id ("If this territorial dispute could be resolved, Congress could have its national 
domain."); id at 373 ("The Virginia cession exemplifies the kind of transactions, submerged 
from view by their very success, that secured the foundations of American federalism and 
helped Americans ... discover a common ground."). 
296. Id at 371 ("[The] Marylanders were convinced that Virginians, with their vast 
open lands, resources, and population, were determined to impoverish their state and reduce it 
to satellite status."). 
297. Onuf, supra note 168, at 458. 
298. Id 
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however, by other states and by separatists demonstrated the 
limitations of these ideas of statehood. Because state boundaries were 
in fact established through bilateral or multilateral agreements, mutual 
recognition became central to American statehood pretentions."299 
It was important for the states to agree that the federal 
government under the Constitution had the authority to acquire 
territory and expand the United States because this authority is not 
enumerated in the Constitution.300 
Indian affairs were in the background of all these questions. 
Indians owned, occupied, and had competing claims to the Western 
lands.30' This gave Indian tribes leverage as to the several, independent 
colonies and subsequent states.302 According to George Washington, 
"[T]he [settlement] of the Western Country and making a Peace with 
the Indians [were] so analogous that there [could] be no definition of 
the one without involving considerations of the other.,,303 Moreover, 
"[t]he danger of Indian war was growing ever greater as uncontrolled 
emigration pushed farther and farther into Indian country and came 
into violent contact with its inhabitants.,,304 The dispute regarding 
massive amounts of land in Indiana and Illinois involving large land 
speculation companies305 would not be finally resolved until Johnson v. 
M'Intosh in 1823.306 But this was a sideline to the real question. 
299. !d at 459. 
300. See Palfrey, supra note 198, at 384 (''A third view was that the express grant of 
power to admit new states included the power to admit a state not yet the property of the 
United States. Th[is view] ... met with the widest acceptance."); cf. id at 372 ("The 
constitutional convention finally gave to the national government the power to make war, the 
power to make treaties, the power to admit new states, and the power to legislate for certain 
state objects. In all of these ways territory might conceivably be acquired; add to these 
acquisitions by discovery, and we have the sum of all possible manners of acquisition."). 
30 I. See, e.g., Newton, supra note 18, at 200 (noting that in the early period of the 
postconstitutional federal government, policies regarding Indians reflected a pragmatic 
realization that conflicts could arise between the nation and Indians). 
302. Cf. PRUCHA, supra note 240, at 28-29 (fmding the settlement of West em lands to 
be linked with peace with the Indians). 
303. Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), quoted in 
PRUCHA, supra note 240, at 28. 
304. Merrill Jensen, The Creation of the National Domain, 1781-1784, 26 MISS. 
VALLEY RIST. REv. 323,339 (1939). 
305. !d at 330-32; Onuf, supra note 143, at 369. 
306. 21 U.S. 543 (8 Wheat.) (1823). See generally LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, 
CONQUEST BY LAW: How THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF 
THEIR LANDS 95-116 (2005) (analyzing Justice Marshall's rationale in Johnson v. M'!ntosh). 
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R The Original Understanding o/the Source of the Indian Affairs 
Power 
There are two potential original understandings of the source of 
the Indian Affairs Power under the Constitution that scholars have not 
yet considered. The first understanding, based on the circumstances 
and politics of the 1789 Framers, suggests that the necessity that 
served as the source of national authority during the national period 
also served as the continuing source of authority for the United States 
even after the ratification of the Constitution. The second, somewhat 
related, theory is that there is a fundamental flaw in the Constitution-
a constitutional necessity-that serves to resurrect the national Indian 
Affairs Power, even in the modern era. 
1. A Generalized ''Necessity'' 
This Part discusses a kind of necessity similar to the kind of 
necessity that created the national Foreign Affairs Power and that 
created the Indian Affairs Power. Unlike the necessity that created the 
Foreign Affairs Power, this necessity arguably remains extant today. 
Yet, one would be hard-pressed to demonstrate that this necessity is (or 
was) as acute as the foreign affairs necessity. It is likely that the 
Constitution squeezed the Indian affairs authority of Congress to 
something less than the national Indian Affairs Power.307 The national 
Indian Affairs Power, perhaps subsumed into nothingness by the 
Articles, returned in the aftermath of the Constitution, available for use 
in a time of necessity by the federal government. 
Consider first that the national necessity of the Indian Affairs 
Power did not decline after the Revolution. If anything, the necessity 
of the United States increased throughout nearly all of the treaty period 
of federal Indian law and policy, which did not end formally until 
1871.308 The necessity of the Indian Affairs Power has shifted and 
changed throughout the entire history of federal Indian law and policy. 
Often in the beginning, the necessity was rnilitary.309 In the last 
307. This is similar to the argument made by Professor Saikrishna Prakash. See 
Prakash, supra note 9, at 1090 (discussing the Convention's rejection of James Madison's 
proposal to grant Congress the power to "regulate affairs with the Indians" in favor of the 
Indian Commerce Clause). 
308. Id 
309. See generally 1 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCFlA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 67-71 (1984) (describing Indian wars and threats 
and the expansion of settlement which required recognition of, and were a threat to, federal 
control). 
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decades of the eighteenth century and then intermittently through the 
nineteenth century, some Indian tribes retained a military capacity and 
salience that constituted a threat to the union and later the United 
States.3lO A second stage of necessity, related to, but different from the 
military necessity, involved the removal of the eastern tribes to the 
West, and later the establishment and maintenance of Indian 
reservation lands.311 The ongoing and continuing necessity of the 
Indian Affairs Power in the modem era is the regulation of the tribal-
federal-state relationship-politically and economically, especially in 
the arenas of public safety and social services.312 This authority, as the 
Kagama Court noted, had to derive from somewhere.313 
Standing alone, this proposed answer mayor may not be 
persuasive to the observer.314 But consider the following new wrinkle 
about the original (mis)understanding of Indian affairs and whether it 
provides a much stronger possibility. 
2. A Constitutional ''Necessity'' 
There is yet another possibility-that the Constitution itself is 
deficient. The deficiency in the Constitution's articulation of the 
United States' authority in the field of Indian affairs could constitute a 
necessity that requires Congress, and perhaps the President, to reach 
back into the national period and tap into the national Indian Affairs 
Power. The reason for this constitutional necessity is that the Founders 
understood there were two categories of Indian tribes.315 The first 
category included the tribes "within" the exterior boundaries of the 
thirteen states, tribes such as the Six Nations of Haudenosaunee and 
the Cherokee Nation.316 The nontribal Indians residing within the 
thirteen states, such as those residing in the New England praying 
310. See generally id at 534-61 (describing the Great Plains Indian wars). 
311. See generally Jd at 214-26 (describing the removal of the Indians from the East 
and South and the opening of land west of the Mississippi River for Indian settlement); id at 
562-81 (describing the reservation period). 
312. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.c. §§ 1301-1303 (2000) (concerning 
tribal sovereignty with respect to criminal jurisdiction); Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 
U.S.c. §§ 1901-1963 (protecting the interests ofIndian children through welfare programs); 
C£ Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.c. § 450 (recognizing 
that federal government programs for Indians have not achieved desired goals). 
313. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886). 
314. Prakash, supra note 9, at 1103 ("Necessity, however strongly felt, cannot enlarge 
the Constitution's grants offederal power."). 
315. See Clinton, supra note 253, at 110 I; see also 6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, supra note 251, at 1078 (1906) (.eferring to two categories ofIndian tribes, those 
"within [and] without" the colonial borders). 
316. 6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 251, at 1078 (1906). 
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towns, constituted a subcategory that the Founders understood to be 
the "Indians not taxed" or the "Indians taxed.,,317 The Founders would 
have understood that these internal tribes would, eventually, assimilate 
or disappear into the rubric of state jurisdiction and American 
citizenship. The second category of tribes included those "without" 
the thirteen states, such as the Three Fires Confederacy of 
Anishinaabeg in the Great Lakes region and all other tribes west of the 
American frontier.3ls The Founders, while arguably not recognizing 
these external tribes as foreign nations or states, dealt with their 
existence in the Constitution via the Indian Commerce Clause.319 The 
problem, of course, is that the more than 560 Indian tribes now 
federally recognized by the United States are internal tribes; tribes that 
the Founders never expected to survive.320 Hence, no constitutional 
provision exists to govern relations with them properly. As such, 
perhaps the preconstitutional power theory in the Lara dictum is 
useful. 
Consider the original understanding of the 1781 and 1789 
Founders. There were Indian tribes located within the exterior 
boundaries of the thirteen united states and there were Indian tribes 
located outside of the exterior boundaries of the United States.321 It is 
possible-and given the statements of the Framers and the 
jurisprudence of the Marshall Court-that the 1789 Founders intended 
for the Constitution to treat the Indian tribes within the United States 
differently from the Indian tribes outside the United States.322 
First consider that the early drafts of the Articles of Confederation 
identified a distinction between tribes located within the boundaries of 
the states.323 Benjamin Franklin's July 21, 1775, draft provided for a 
treaty alliance with the Six Nations of New York, later to be used as a 
model for all other tribes.324 That proposal morphed into Article XIV 
of the July 12, 1776, draft: 
317. See Clinton, supra note 105, at 125 (discussing the exclusion of the "Indians not 
taxed" from the census). 
318. See 6 JOURNALS OFTHE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 251, at 1078 (1906). 
319. See Clinton, supra note 253, at 1158. 
320. See Newton, supra note 18, at 200. 
321. Clinton, supra note 253, at 1150. 
322. See 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 251, at 549 (1906) 
(reprinting a draft of article XIV); Clinton, supra note 253, at 1100. 
323. 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 251, at 198 (1905) 
(reprinting Franklin's draft of article XI); see Clinton, supra note 253, at 1099. 
324. 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 251, at 198 (1905). 
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A perpetual Alliance, offensive and defensive, is to be entered into by 
the United States assembled as soon as may be, with the Six Nations, 
and all other neighbouring Nations of Indians; their Limits to be 
ascertained, their Lands to be secured to them, and not encroached on; 
no Purchases of Lands, hereafter to be made of the Indians by Colonies 
or private Persons before the Limits of the Colonies are ascertained, to 
be valid: All Purchases of Lands not included within those Limits, 
where ascertained, to be made by Contracts between the United States 
assembled, or by Persons for that Purpose authorized by them, and the 
great Councils of the Indians, for the general Benefit of all the United 
Colonies.325 
Professor Bob Clinton reviewed the same history with an eye to the 
question of whether the states could "interfere" with Indian affairs,326 
but I will take a different view. Once again, the 1776 draft identified 
the Six Nations of New York for special treatment, but added "other 
neighbouring Nations of Indians"-that is, similarly situated Indian 
tribes.327 A plausible reading here would be that the drafters viewed at 
least two different classes of Indian tribes-those like the Six Nations 
(a powerful and organized Indian confederacy located within the 
boundaries of New York State) and those unlike the Six Nations. 
Given that the remainder of the provision anticipates that the states will 
have jurisdiction over lands bought and sold by Indian tribes after the 
execution of a treaty conforming to the article-a situation that could 
only arise inside the boundaries of one of the states-the article does 
not apply to affairs with Indian tribes located outside the boundaries of 
the United States.328 Professor Clinton's research shows that the 1776 
debates anticipated and understood that there were two classes of 
Indian tribes-those '''within or without the real or pretended limits of 
any Colony.",329 Thomas Jefferson, at one point, moved "that all 
purchases of lands, not within the boundan"es of any Colony, shall be 
made by Congress of the Indians in a great Council.,,330 The next draft 
325. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 251, at 549 (1906) 
(reprinting a draft of article XIV) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see Clinton, supra 
note 253, at 1100. 
326. Clinton, supra note 253, at 1100 (quoting John Dickinson's marginal note, 
repnnted In 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 251, at 549 n.2 (1906)). 
327. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 251, at 549 (1906) 
(reprinting a draft of article XIV)(emphasis added); see Clinton, supra note 253, at 1100. 
328. See Clinton, supra note 253, at 110 I. 
329. ld ("We have no right over the Indians, whether withIn or without the real or 
pretended limits of any Colony. They will not allow themselves to be classed according to 
the bounds of Colonies." (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
330. 6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 251, at 1076 (1906) 
(emphasis added); Clinton, supra note 253, at 1100. 
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(August 20, 1776) included language that sounds similar to the text of 
the Indians Not Taxed Clause of the Constitution: Congress would 
possess the authority in "regulating the trade, and managing all affairs 
with the Indians, not members of any of the States.,,331 Importantly, the 
previous paragraph in the draft noted that new colonies could be 
created "in Lands ... hereafter to be purchased or obtained" from 
Indian tribes.332 In other words, in lands then owned by Indian tribes 
not within the boundaries of the united colonies. A year later, the 
Framers took up the Indian Affairs Clause in Article XIV in the 
context of classifying two types of tribes, internal and external.333 The 
distinction between tribes located within and without the united 
colonies was retained in Article VI of the Artic1es334 and it would 
remain implicit in Article IX, which provided: 
The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and 
exclusive right and power of regulating ... the trade and managing all 
affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States, provided that 
the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or 
violated .... ,,335 
The proviso is explained, according to Professor Clinton, when the 
delegation reached a compromise off the record.336 
331. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 251, at 682 (1906) 
(reprinting a draft of article XIV of Aug. 20, 1776); see Clinton, supra note 253, at 1100; see 
also Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403 (1857) ("[The Indian race], it is true, 
fonned no part of the colonial communities, and never amalgamated with them in social 
connections or in government. But although they were uncivilized, they were yet a free and 
independent people, associated together in nations or tribes, and governed by their own 
laws."). 
332. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 251, at 682 (1906) 
(reprinting a draft of article XIV of Aug. 20,1776). 
333. 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 251, at 844 (1907) ("It 
was moved to strike out in the 19 and 20 lines 'not members of any of the states,' and insert 
'not residing within the limits of any of the United States;' to this an amendment was moved 
to strike out the whole paragraph and insert, 'managing all affairs relative to war and peace 
with all Indians not members of any particular State, and regulating the trade with such 
nations and tribes as are not resident within such limits wherein a particular State claims, and 
actually exercises jurisdiction' .... "); Clinton, supra note 253, at 1102. 
334. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI (U.S. 1781) (anticipating that a state 
might "receive[] certain advice of a resolution being fonned by some nation of Indians to 
invade such State"); see also Prakash, supra note 9, at 1084 ("Indeed, if the drafters of the 
Articles merely considered the Indians marauding scofflaws, there would be no need to 
specially authorize state action. Stopping Indian scofflaws would have been an ordinary 
matter of state law enforcement, not an occasion for making war, and hence not a concern for 
either the Articles or the Constitution."). 
335. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (emphasis added). 
336. See Clinton, supra note 253, at 1102-03. 
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Consider further the possibility that the 1789 Founders believed 
(or wished) that the Indian tribes located within the United States 
would eventually assimilate (or disappear) into the states in which they 
were located. Nell Jessup Newton demonstrated that "[t]he absence of 
a general power over Indian affairs in the Constitution is not surprising 
to students of history, for at the time the Constitution was drafted, the 
framers regarded Indian tribes as sovereign nations, albeit nations that 
would soon either move West, assimilate, or become extinct.,,337 
President Washington hoped that federal Indian policy would "attach" 
Indian tribes to the United States, "imparting to them the blessings of 
civilization,"338 that is, assimilation. President Jefferson advocated for 
the support of Indian trading houses in order "[t]o encourage them to 
abandon hunting, to apply to the raising [of] stock, to agriculture, and 
domestic manufacture.,,339 Moreover, the "attachment" of Indian tribes 
to the United States was thought critical to the preservation of peace, 
as Professor Clinton speculated in connection with the Treaty of Fort 
Pitt provisions: 
Perhaps ... signatory parties [in early American-Indian treaty 
negotiations] concluded that a permanent arrangement in which Indian 
nations live within the exterior boundaries of another country in which 
they have no representation and to which they owe no allegiance might 
constitute a permanently unstable political situation, fraught with 
potential for conflict, misunderstanding and violence (a description that, 
with the benefit of hindsight, \vas not far from what ultimately 
happened).340 
Most importantly, the 1789 Framers retained the understanding that 
there were two classes of Indian tribes-those within the United States 
337. Newton, supra note 18, at 200 (citing ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR., THE WHITE 
MAN'S INDIAN: IMAGES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN FROM COLUMBUS TO THE PRESENT 134-45 
(1978); PRUCHA, supra note 240, at 28-31, 213-27; S. LYMAN TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN 
POLICY 32-43 (1973)). 
338. George Washington, Third Annual Message (Oct. 25, 1791), in DOCUMENTS OF 
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 15, 15 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000). 
339. President Jefferson on Indian Trading Houses (Jan. 18,1803), in DOCUMENTS OF 
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 338, at 21, 21; see also Robert W McCluggage, 
The Senate and Indian Land Titles, 1800-1825, I WHIST. Q. 415, 415-16 (1970) ("When 
once you have property, you will want laws and magistrates to protect your property and 
persons .... You will find that our laws are good for this purpose ... you will unite 
yourselves with us ... form one people with us, and we shall all be Americans .... " (quoting 
16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 452 (1903))). 
340. Clinton, supra note 105, at 126 (referencing the Treaty of Fort Pitt with the 
Delaware Nation, supra note 87, at 14-15); cf Clinton, supra note 253, at 1104 (discussing 
the special cases of certain eastern tribes-the Pamunkey in Virginia, the Mohegan and 
Pequot tribes in Connecticut, and the Massachusetts Indian praying towns). 
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and those outside the United States--evidenced by James Madison's 
proposal to authorize the federal government "'[t]o regulate affairs 
with the Indians as well within as without the limits of the U[ nited] 
States.',,341 Assuming assimilation, no special constitutional provision 
would be necessary to deal with Indian tribes. It would appear, then, 
that within the boundaries of the United States there would be two 
classes of individual Indians-tribal Indians and nontribal Indians. 
The Framers recognized the fIrst category as "Indians not taxed"-
once at the 1789 Founding and once again in the Fourteenth 
Amendmene42 According to this logic, no constitutional provision 
was necessary to cover the second category. 
The Marshall Court's jurisprudence reflected this understanding 
as well.343 The split Court in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, discussing 
these points decades after the Founding, appears to have supported this 
theory.344 Justice Johnson's assertion that the Cherokee Nation could 
not be considered a foreign state-or even a nation at aIrs-perhaps 
presupposes that the Founders believed (or wished) that the internal 
Indian tribes would disappear. Chief Justice Marshall's lead opinion, 
holding that Indian tribes did constitute states (domestic dependent 
nations ),346 does not damage this theory. Chief Justice Marshall 
implied that perhaps the original understanding was that the Founders 
believed (or wished) the internal Indian tribes would assimilate, but 
that the reaIity of the postratification federal Indian policy was to 
engage these tribes in treaty negotiations and to deal with Indian 
341. 2 THE RECORDS OF TIIE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 324 (Aug. 18, 1787) 
(Max Farrand ed., 1911 ) (emphasis added); cf Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 
(1824) ("In the regulation of trade with the Indian tribes, the action of the law, especially 
when the constitution was made, was chiefly within a State."). 
342. See generally George Beck, The Fourteenth Amendment as Related to Tribal 
Indians: Seetion I, "Suil/eet to the Junsdiction Thereof" and Section U, "Excluding Indians 
Not Taxed," 28 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RESEARCH J. 37 (2004) (examining the phrases 
"excluding Indians not taxed" and "subject to the jurisdiction" in relation to Sections 1 and 2 
of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
343. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-20 (1831). 
344. /d 
345. See id at 25 (Johnson, J., concurring) ("Must every petty kraal of Indians, 
designating themselves a tribe or nation, and having a few hundred acres of land to hunt on 
exclusively, be recognized as a state?"); see also id at 40 (Baldwin, J., concurring in 
judgment) ("[T]he Cherokees were then dependants, having given up all their affairs to the 
regulation and management of congress, and that all the regulations of congress, over Indian 
affairs were then in force over an immense territory, under a solemn pledge to the inhabitants, 
that whenever their population and circumstances would admit they should form constitutions 
and become free, sovereign and independent states on equal footing with the old component 
members of the confederation ..... "). 
346. ld at 16-17 (majority opinion). 
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affairs under the Indian Commerce Clause.347 As such, these internal, 
nonassimilated Indian tribes retained-and would forever retain-
some form of national sovereignty of their own, dependent upon and 
subservient to the American national sovereignty expressed in the 
Indian Commerce Clause.348 We now know-absent a future 
catastrophic alteration of federal Indian law and policy-that the more 
than 560 federally recognized Indian tribes fit within this category,349 a 
category that perhaps the 1789 Founders never believed (or wished) 
would survive and a category that the Founders believed never 
required a comprehensive constitutional provision.350 
Consider finally that the 1789 Founders believed (or wished) that 
the nonassimilated Indian tribes located in the Western lands would 
relocate (or be removed) even further west or would become subsumed 
and assimilate into the United States as the nation added states and 
territories. These "external" Indian tribes would be subservient to the 
sovereignty of the United States-as the Trade and Intercourse Acts351 
and the Doctrine of Discovery implied/52 and Johnson v. M'Intosh 
347. Id at 16 ("They have been unifonnly treated as a state from the settlement of our 
country. The numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize them as a 
people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being responsible in their 
political character for any violation of their engagements, or for any aggression committed on 
the citizens of the United States by any individual of their community. Laws have been 
enacted in the spirit of these treaties. The acts of our govemment plainly recognize the 
Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are bound by those acts."). 
One could argue that the relations between the Americans and Indian tribes had to be 
conducted through treaty negotiations. See Michael Asch, Levi-Strauss and the Political· 
The Elementary Structures of Kinship and the Resolution of Relations Between Indigenous 
Peoples and Settler States, 11 1. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 425, 436 (2005) ("[T]he 
concept of 'Treaty' is intended to frame the political relationship between indigenous peoples 
and Canada in a manner that brings Self and Other together while maintaining each other's 
autonomy .... "). 
348. Or as the Attorney General's pithy words asserted, Indians are the "domestic 
subjects" of the United States. N.D. Houghton, The Legal Status of Indian Sufffage in the 
United States, 19 CAL. L. REV. 507, 510 (1931) (quoting 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 746 (1856». 
349. See generally Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of "Domestic 
Dependent Nations" in the Twenty-First CentuIy: Tdba/ Sovereignty Re-envisioned, 
Reinvigorated, and Re-empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REv. 443, 514 n.323 (2005) ("Indian 
societies did not disappear by assimilating to the dominate white culture, as predicted, but 
assimilated to themselves bits and pieces of the surrounding cultural environment. And they 
remained indubitably Indian, whether their constituents lived in a tight Indian community or 
commuted between the community and an urban job market." (quoting D'ARcy McNICKLE, 
THEY CAME HERE FIRST 283 (rev. ed. 1975». 
350. SeeNewton, supra note 18, at 200. 
351. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 27, § 1.03[2], at 
37-41. 
352. See WILLIAMS, supra note 263, at 218-21. 
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explicitly held353-and perhaps subject, in addition, to the Foreign 
Affairs Power shared by the President and Congress. 
But there are no longer any external Indian tribes-and the 
provisions in the Constitution dealing with the internal Indian tribes 
are insufficient. What the 1789 Founders presumed in broad strokes 
would come to pass-the assimilation and disappearance of Indian 
tribes-never happened As such, we are left with a Constitution that 
does not adequately reflect the reality of Indian affairs in modem 
America. The constitutional provisions that the Court tends to rely 
upon as the source of federal plenary power-the Indian Commerce 
Clause, the Treaty Clause, the Property Clause, and even the Foreign 
AffairslWar Power-might not be sufficient (nor were they intended to 
deal with the current circumstances). We are left with a constitutional 
necessity, an error in the constitutional drafting based on a false 
prediction from the 1789 Founders. Hence, a national Indian Affairs 
Power predating the Constitution as identified by Justice Breyer could 
be the answer. 
However, the Lara dictum arouses opposition from those who 
espouse the original understanding of the Constitution as the only 
means of interpreting the Constitution. In Professor Saikrishna 
Prakash's phrasing, "Necessity, however strongly felt, cannot enlarge 
the Constitution's grants of federal power.,,354 He found the Lara 
dictum "the most puzzling" of all the theories of the sources for the 
Indian Affairs Power,355 distinguishing Kagama's wardship theori56 and 
Professor Phil Frickey'S international law theory.3S7 Professor Prakash 
wrote: 
It is hard to see why any government, let alone a government of 
enumerated powers, would have an "inherent" ''preconstitutional 
power" to completely control another nation. At the extreme, the 
Supreme Court's claim bizarrely suggests not only that the United 
States might have an inherent plenary power over other nations 
(Mexico, Canada?) but also that other nations (Russia, Portugal?) might 
have the same power over the United States.358 
353. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573-74 (1823); WILLIAMS, supra note 263, at 308-17. 
354. Prakash, supra note 9, at 1103. 
355. Id at 1104. 
356. Id at 1103-04. 
357. Id at 1104 (discussing Frickey, supra note 3, at 31,37,75-80,85). 
358. Id at 1104-05 (footnote omitted); see also id at 1116 ("[T]he federal government 
did not acquire a plenary power over Taiwan when it ended diplomatic recognition of the 
Nationalist government of the Republic of China."). 
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It appears Professor Prakash attempted to take the Lara dictum to a 
logical extreme as a rhetorical means of disputing the theory, but his 
argument suffers from the same fatal flaw that befalls all originalists. 
Like Justice Thomas before him, Professor Prakash is unwilling or 
unable to recognize the history of federal-tribal relations because that 
history is not reflected in the Constitution.359 The 1789 Framers of the 
Indian Commerce Clause presumed that American civilization would 
win out and quash Indian civilization, exterminating Indian tribes as 
political entities-it simply did not happen.36o Professor Prakash 
prefers to read the evolution of Article IX's grant of federal power to 
Congress to the Indian Commerce Clause as a devolution of power by 
assuming the original understanding of the Clause could be 
determined through a negative inference,361 but such a reading elevates 
a negative inference to a position of authority higher than the acts of 
the 1789 Founders, who exercised a vigorous Indian Affairs Power in 
the First Congress.362 Originalism renders the Indian Commerce 
359. Newton, supra note 18, at 200. 
360. Id 
361. Prakash, supra note 9, at 1090 (discussing the Convention's rejection of James 
Madison's proposal to grant Congress the power to "regulate affairs with the Indians" in favor 
of the Indian Commerce Clause (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
362. See AMAR, supra note 101, at 108 n.* ("It also bears notice that the First 
Congress enacted a statute regulating noneconomic interactions and altercations-
'intercourse'-with Indians. Section 5 of this act dealt with crimes-whether economic or 
not--{;ommitted by Americans on Indian lands." (citation omitted)); Akhil Reed Amar, 
America's Constitution and the Yale School of Constitutional Interpretation, 115 YALE LJ. 
1997, 2004 n.25 (2006) ("It also bears note that none of the leading c1ausebound advocates of 
a narrow economic reading of 'commerce' has come to grips with the basic inadequacy of 
their reading as applied to Indian tribes, or has squarely confronted the originalist 
implications of the Indian Intercourse Act of 1790, in which the First Congress plainly 
regulated noneconomic intercourse with Indian tribes."); Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering 
American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE LJ. 1256, 1300 
(2006) ("Congress's satisfaction with presidential administration with respect to Indian tribes 
may simply have mirrored its judgment concerning executive authority with respect to the 
War and State Departments. From the political perspective of the late eighteenth century, 
commerce with the Indian tribes may have seemed less like regulating interstate commerce 
than like some combination of the exercise of the war and foreign affairs powers. Essentially 
standard less regulatory authority may have been given to the President because Congress 
understood Indian affairs to be an executive-meaning political-function, but was not sure 
which executive department should take on the task."); Angela R. Riley, Recovenng 
Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. LJ. 175, 205 (2000) ("The United States Constitution, this country's primary 
political treatise, acknowledges Indian Nations' unique status through the '''Indian Commerce 
Clause.'" The Indian Commerce Clause extends a grant of singular authority to Congress to 
regulate intercourse and trade with Indian tribes, the only minority group explicitly 
mentioned in the Constitution. Just as the Foreign Nations Clause provides for federal control 
of commercial relations with foreign nations, the Indian Commerce Clause in effect 
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Clause all but an absurdity. Surely, the Founders could not have 
understood a provision of the Constitution in this manner. 
Finally, the Lara dictum should not be such a difficult pill to 
swallow. Consider the most important objections to the theory of a 
pre constitutional Foreign Affairs Power (or any inherent power): "The 
assertion of inherent power in the president threatens the doctrine of 
separated powers and the system of checks and balances. Sovereignty 
moves from the constitutional principles of self-government, popular 
control, and republican government to the White House.,,363 No threat 
of tyranny or other harm to the rights of the people exists in the 
exercise of the Indian Affairs Power, which has been exercised by 
Congress aggressivelysince 1790.364 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has always sidestepped the question of the 
extent and source of the authority of Congress and the Executive 
branch to deal with Indian affairs. But recent cases, such as Lara,365 
suggest that some Justices are ready to make a sweeping decision 
about the Indian Affairs Power. Moreover, these Justices would 
attempt to bring Indian law into conformity with the rest of American 
public law and Commerce Clause jurisprudence.366 It would be a 
serious misreading of the original understanding and subsequent 
history of federal Indian law to make that determination. 
Yet, the cases that could afford the Court this opportunity to turn 
Indian law on its head may already be in the pipeline. While Lara 
seemed to answer the question in the context of the congressional 
authority to affirm tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember 
Indians, the Court left open the question of whether Congress can 
authorize a domestic sovereign to prosecute American citizens without 
the full array of criminal procedural rights. 367 The Court may be asked 
recognizes the tribes' unique position as quasi-sovereign nations-within-a-nation, and shields 
them from state and local interference." (footnotes omitted)). 
363. Fisher, supra note 1, at 2. 
364. In fact, Congress has delegated massive authority to the Executive branch. See 
25 U.S.c. § 2 (2000). 
365. 541 U.S. 193,200-02 (2004). 
366. See generally Frickey, supra note 26, at 435 n.14 (exploring judicial frustration 
with the "complexities" and "insignificance" of federal Indian law). 
367. Compare Troy A. Eid, Beyond Oliphant: Strengthening Criminal Justice in 
Indian CountIy, 54 FED. LAW., Mar'/Apr. 2007, at 40, 44-46 (arguing for tribal authority to 
prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes on Indian lands while retaining defendants' 
constitutional rights), with Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Promoting Tribal Self-Detennination in a 
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to address the constitutionality of the Indian Child Welfare Acf68 and 
federal statutes and regulations authorizing the Secretary of Interior to 
take land into trust for the benefit of Indians and Indian tribes.369 The 
constitutionality of these statues, assuming they are declared 
unconstitutional at some point in the future, implicates the 
constitutionality of still other statutes-including the Major Crimes 
Act, the focal point of federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country.370 
Regardless, perhaps the Court will continue to base its understanding 
of congressional plenary power over Indian affairs in the Indian 
Commerce Clause. But as some scholarship suggests, this is a weak 
source of authority.371 
If the Court were serious about locating a source of the Indian 
Affairs Power, then it should at the very least engage its "original 
understanding" search engines and find whether a source of authority 
exists outside of the Indian Commerce Clause or the structure of the 
Constitution. It has yet to do so and may be surprised at what it finds. 
Post-Oliphant World· An Altemative Road Map, 54 FED. LAW., Mar.! Apr. 2007, at 41, 41, 43 
(arguing for the same right without Western notions of criminal justice). 
368. See, e.g., InreSantosY., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d692, 723-31 (Ct.App. 2001). 
369. See, e.g., Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15,39-43 (1st Cir. 2007) (en bane), 
petition forceI1. filed, 76 U.S.L.w. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 18,2007) (No. 07-526). 
370. See generally Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 
MICH. L. REv. 709, 741-74 (2006) (exploring the constitutional implications of the Major 
Crimes Act in the context of jury composition, publicity, and venue). 
371. See Prakash, supra note 9, at 1087-90. 
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